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LESSONS FOR TAX REFORMERS FROM THE
HISTORY OF THE ENERGY TAX INCENTIVES IN
THE WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1980t
ROBERT S. MCINTYRE*
On March 27, 1980, after almost a year of consideration, Congress ap-
proved a windfall profit tax on the increased revenues which oil producers will
realize from decontrol of domestic oil prices.' Included in this legislation are a
t Copyright © 1981 by Boston College Law School.
Director of Federal Tax Policy, Citizens for Tax Justice, Washington, D.C.; former-
ly director of Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group; A.B., Providence College, 1970;
J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1975; LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1976.
' The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-233 (1980). Accord-
ing to the Joint Committee on Taxation staff economists, the oil companies and royalty owners
stand to garner an additional $938 billion in gross revenues over the 1980-90 period (net of $87
billion in assumed additional production costs), and to realize a net gain before federal taxes of
$783 billion. (Federal and state royalties will take $51 billion and state and local taxes will slice off
$104 billion.) See R.S. McIntyre, The ;300 Billion Windfall, PEOPLE & TAXES, March 1980, at 1,
3. The Joint Committee staff estimates postulate, among other things, a $30 per barrel price for
uncontrolled oil at the end of 1979 and price increases of two percentage points over the inflation
rate annually in succeeding years. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, GENERAL EX-
PLANATION OF THE CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1980, at 9 (1981). The assump-
tions are artificial, and James Wetzler, the chief economist for the Joint Committee, says that his
tax revenue estimates could be inaccurate by as much as $100 billion in either direction. See R.
Samuelson, The ;100 Billion Mistake — Is the 'Windfall' Revenue Estimate Too High? NATIONAL
JOURNAL, April 26, 1980, at 677.
Based on the historical record and various theoretical constructs, the federal income tax
by itself could have been relied on to recapture only about $157 billion of the remaining $783
billion "windfall." See, e.g., Crude Oil Tax: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on H.R.
3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 644 (July 18, 1979) (statement of Robert S. McIntyre). This would
have left the oil producers with some $626 billion in added after-tax profits over the next decade,
a sum which would have at least tripled their current, already high profit levels. See R.S. McIn-
tyre, The ;300 Billion Windfall, PEOPLE & TAXES, March 1980, at 1, 4. For analyses of the high
profitability of the oil producers in terms of return on equity, see, e.g. , id. (return on equity of the
top 20 companies in 1979 was 44% above the average for the other 1160 largest companies in the
U.S.); PEOPLE & TAXES, May 1980, at 12 (annualized return on equity for top 20 oil companies
in the first quarter of 1960 was 30%, almost double that of other large companies); Citizen/Labor
Energy Coalition, Energy Action Educational Foundation, and Tax Reform Research Group,
OIL COMPANY PROFITS: WHAT THEY MEAN AND WHERE THEY GO, Nov. 14, 1979 (reported
oil company profits are understated by at least one-third).
The primary purpose of the windfall profit tax, in former President Carter's words, is
to recover a substantial share of the new producer profits for the commonweal, to avoid putting
"an undue burden on people who can hardly make ends meet as it is." Energy Address by
President Carter at 1, 3 (April 5, 1979). The windfall tax which was ultimately approved can be
praised for the size of the amount it effectively recovers — about $330 billion, or 53% of the $626
billion the oil producers would have kept without the tax — or criticized for what it leaves the oil
companies — $296 billion, or a doubling of their current annual profits. See R.S. McIntyre, The
1300 Billion Windfall, PEOPLE & TAXES, March 1980, at 1.
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number of new or expanded income tax preferences designed either to stimu-
late the development of alternative energy sources or to promote conservation. 2
This article relates the tugging and hauling with Congress which produced
these new energy tax incentives, analyzes the merits of a number of the pro-
posals, and attempts to draw some lessons about legislative strategy for those
who are concerned about the rapid growth of tax expenditures 3 and the increas-
ing popularity of tax subsidy programs.
Part I points out the sharp conflict between the House and Senate over the
desirability of added energy tax benefits, and outlines the final compromise,
which rejected or limited many of the proposals favored by the Senate. Part II
offers a critical history of the congressional debates, and includes a detailed
evaluation, based on the now-familiar tax expenditure analysis, of the argu-
ments made for and against the various tax credit proposals. In particular, the
tax incentive approaches are compared to the direct spending alternatives
which were also available to Congress and which to some extent were adopted
instead of added talc incentives. Based on this evaluation, uniformly negative
conclusions are drawn about the merits of energy tax preferences as policy
tools. Part II concludes by noting a rather clear lesson which can be drawn
from the experience with the energy tax proposals for those who generally op-
pose the use of the tax system as a vehicle for government subsidies. That
lesson is that Congress will be more responsive to arguments that a direct
spending approach is preferable if such an alternative is actually available,
rather than merely hypothetical. It therefore behooves reformers to ally
themselves with proponents of direct subsidies when the goal — but not the
means — of a proposed new tax expenditure seems a worthy one.
These estimates differ from the "official" tallies, because the Joint Committee on Tax-
ation staff assumed an "effective" income tax rate of 45%. There were respectable technical and
tactical reasons for this assumption, but it is implausible in real life. See, e.g. , Crude Oil Tax: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on H. R. 3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 644 (July 18, 1979)
(statement of Robert S. McIntyre). In any event, the Joint Committee staff estimate of the effec-
tive windfall tax rate on what the oil companies would Otherwise have netted is also 53%, equal
to $227.7 billion in "net" windfall tax (the $410.5 billion in gross tax reduced by the presumed
45% income tax offset) divided by the $431 billion in profits the oil companies would otherwise
have kept using the 45% income tax rate assumption ($783 billion times 0.55 equals $431
billion).
2
 Pub. L. No. 96-223, SS 201 et seq. (1980), amending I.R.C. SS 44-C, 46, 48.
3
 When the first tax expenditure budget was drawn up in 1968, there were 40 separate
items involving a revenue cost of about $44 billion. See A Review of Selected Tax Expenditures: Invest-
ment Tax Credit: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [hereinafter Investment Tax Credit Hearings], at 37 (statement of Paul R.
McDaniel). For Fiscal 1982, the tax expenditure budget includes about 100 items, and totals
$266 billion. Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPEND-
ITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 1981-86 (Mar. 16, 1981) [hereinafter JT. Comm. — TAX EXPEND.
ITURES], at 8-15. As Professor McDaniel has noted, "[e]ven taking into account that part of the
increase in the number of items is due to more refined budget presentation techniques . .
there has obviously been an enormous increase over the past decade in the extent to which tax ex-
penditures are employed." Investment Tax Credit Hearings, supra, at 58.
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Part III of this article draws a more subtle and perhaps more important
lesson from the congressional debates over the energy tax incentive proposals.
This lesson involves the limits to tax expenditure analysis, especially as it is
understood in the legislative arena. To evaluate tax preferences within the
same framework employed for direct spending programs is useful, but it does
not offer a complete basis for analyzing tax provisions. The failure to realize
this limitation has led recently to the use of tax expenditure analysis in ways its
creators never intended. Proposed new loopholes have been evaluated — and
sometimes enacted — purely on spending grounds, while other important tax
policy issues have been ignored. Tax reformers should be aware of this
phenomenon, and should begin again to stress the tax policy arguments —
primarily fairness and administrability — which tax expenditure analysis has
tended to relegate to inferior status.
I. THE NEW ENERGY TAX PREFERENCES: WHAT THEY
ARE AND WHAT THEY MIGHT HAVE BEEN
As finally accepted by the conferees and the Congress, the energy tax in-
centives included in the windfall profit tax bill are relatively paltry. Table A,
below, tells much of the story. On the residential side, the increased credits are
projected to reduce federal revenues by a mere $600 million over the 1980-85
period,' after which they are supposed to terminate. All but 11 percent of this
reduction in tax collections is due to a provision raising the solar, wind, and
geothermal credit to 40 percent (of up to $10,000 in expenditures per resi-
dence). 5 Between 1980 and 1985, this $600 million represents only 0.6 percent
of the projected "net" windfall profit tax revenues, 6 0.2 percent of the total
estimated increase in government funds due to oil decontrol,' and approxi-
mately 0.03 percent of personal tax receipts' On the business side, the new tax
subsidies are larger, but still amount to only $8.3 billion between 1980 and
4 CONF. REP. ON H.R. 3919, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 164-65 (1980).
This credit previously had been 30% of the first $2,000 in expenditures and 20% of
the next $8,000, for a maximum of $2,200. 1.R.C. § 44C(b)(2) as enacted by the Energy Tax Act
of 1978, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(a) (1978). The remaining $67 million in residential credits
reflects landlords' share of the increase in the business solar and wind energy credit to 15%, from
10%. Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 221 (1980); I.R.C. 5 46(a)(2)(C).
6 The "net" figure used here is the Joint Committee on Taxation staff estimate of
$103.7 billion between 1980 and 1985. See CONF. REP. ON H.R. 3919, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 164
(1980).
7 Between 1980 and 1990, it is estimated that $51 billion in federal and state royalties,
$104 billion in state and local taxes, $75 billion in federal income taxes, and $410.5 billion in
gross windfall profit tax will be collected as a result of decontrol, for a total of $640 billion. See
R.S. McIntyre, The $300 Billion Windfall, PEOPLE & TAXES, March 1980, at 3. The total addi-
tion to government revenues between 1980 and 1985 is approximately $291 billion.
In fiscal 1980, the individual income tax raised $244 billion. Office of Management
and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions (March 1981), at 122. The assumption used here is
that this amount will grow by about 10% annually in succeeding years. Cf. id. (showing a 10.3%
annual increase between 1980 and 1986).
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1990 — equal to 3.6 percent of the "net" windfall tax collections, 9 1.3 percent
of the increase in government revenues from decontrol,'° and approximately
0.9 percent of projected corporate income tax receipts" over those eleven
years.
These energy tax benefits were not always set at such a low level,
however. The bill reported by the Senate included almost $26 billion in new
energy tax incentives over the 1980-90 period — $8.7 billion to residences and
$17.2 billion to businesses. This represented over 14 percent of the "net"
revenues expected to be garnered by the Senate's weak version of the windfall
tax." Moreover, at one time in its consideration of the windfall bill, the Senate
Finance Committee had tentatively approved almost $100 billion in new
energy credits — $54 billion to businesses and $46 billion to homeownersi°
Under the oil price estimates then being used and in conjunction with the many
exceptions to the windfall tax which the Finance Committee had created,' 4
these credits would have cost $35 billion more than the Committee's windfall
tax would have raised.' 5
9
 The "net" figure used here is the joint Committee on Taxation staff estimate of
$227.7 billion for the 1980-90 period. CONF. REP. ON H.R. 3919, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 165
(1980).
" 1626 billion. See note 1 supra.
" The corporate income tax currently raises under 170 billion a year. Office of
Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions (March 1981), at 122. In light of the
many proposals to provide massive reductions in corporate tax through depreciation "reform,"
this figure is unlikely to increase substantially over the 1980-90 period. See, e.g., id. (showing cor-
porate income tax revenues averaging only $68 billion from 1980 through 1986).
11
 Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, CONFERENCE COMPARISON ON H.R. 3919,
Dec. 18, 1979, at 48. The joint Committee on Taxation staff estimated that the Senate bill would
have collected $177.8 billion over the 1980-90 period. Id.
' 5
 The Finance Committee began marking up the windfall tax bill in earnest on
September 18, 1979, By September 27, the Committee had approved increases in the residential
solar and conservation credits to 50%, with $5,000 and $1,000 maximum credits respectively,
and had added to the list of eligible investments heat pumps, wood stoves, replacement furnaces,
and various other items. On the business side, a 40% credit for solar, geothermal, hydro, ocean
thermal, wind, and biomass had been approved. See The Washington Post, Sept. 26 and 27,
1979; The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 20 and 21, 1979.
14
 By September 27, 1979, the Committee had approved $25.4 billion in windfall tax
reductions, including exemptions for heavy, newly discovered, and tertiary oil. See The Washing-
ton Post, Sept. 28, 1979.
15
 Until October 19, 1979, the Joint Committee on Taxation revenue estimates were
based on an assumed $22/barrel price for uncontrolled oil in the third quarter of 1979, growing at
the rate of inflation plus one percent a year. See Senate Committee on Finance, Press Release No.
151 (Oct. 19, 1979). This put the 1980-90 net revenue gain from the House bill at $104 billion,
and that from the Finance Committee bill, as of September 27, 1979, at $69 billion. On October
19, the Finance Committee agreed to increase the price estimates to $30/barrel as of the last
quarter of 1979, growing at 2% over inflation annually. See Senate Committee on Finance, Press
Release No. 151 (Oct. 19, 1979). This change increased the 1980-90 estimate for the House
windfall tax to $277 billion, and the estimate for the Finance Committee bill to $138 billion. (The
estimate for the Finance Committee exemptions to the House tax was increased to $139 billion.)
See CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1979: REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE ON H.R. 3919, S. REP. No. 96-394, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1979).
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Unlike the Senate, the House of Representatives - following the lead of
the Ways and Means Committee - had not included any energy tax
preferences in its version of the windfall profit tax bill. As a result, in the
House-Senate conference on the windfall bill, the House conferees insisted on
sharp reductions in both the scope and the cost of the Senate's proposed new
tax credits. Ultimately, the conferees agreed to delete a number of the Senate
proposals, and to reduce the size and limit the duration of most of the remain-
ing items. The result of these changes - detailed in Table A, below - was to
cut the estimated cost of the new tax incentives over the 1980-90 period by
almost two-thirds - or $17 billion. This is certainly a significant change; it
may, however, somewhat overstate the actual cutbacks in the Senate measures
achieved by the House conferees. Crucial to much of the apparent reduction in
the cost of the new incentives is the application of a 1985 termination date to a
number of major tax credits - as opposed to 1990 or later expiration dates in
the Senate bill. 16 If past practice holds true, many - or most - of the
"limited" effective dates will be extended perfunctorily, thereby negating
many of the House "victories.""
The press had great fun mocking the Finance Committee's profligacy. See, e.g.,
The Washington Post, Sept. 27, 1979 ("The Senate Finance Committee yesterday broke the
bank . . ."); The Wall Street Journal, Sept. 25, 1979 ("Senate Unit Has 'Spent' Funds
From Tax on Windfall Profits Before Passing Bill").
6 Provisions so limited included the residential solar, wind, and geothermal credit and
the business solar and wind, geothermal, ocean thermal, small scale hydro, and biomass credits.
17 See, e.g. , the "temporary" increase in the investment tax credit (I.R.C. S 46) to 10%
in the 1975 Tax Reduction Act, $ 301 of Pub. L. No. 94-12, which was extended to January 1,
1981 in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, 5 802 of Pub. L. No. 94-455, and made permanent in the
Revenue Act of 1978, S 311 of Pub. L. No. 95-600; the "temporary" increase in the corporate
surtax exemption (I.R.C. $ 11) in $ 303 of Pub. L. No. 94-12 (1975) which was extended to
January 1, 1981 in 5 901(a) of Pub. L. No. 94-455 (1976) and then in essence expanded and
made permanent in 5 301(a) of Pub. L. No. 95-600 (1978); the "temporary" five-year amortiza-
tion for child care facilities (I.R,C. 5 188) in the Revenue Act of 1971, 5 303 of Pub. L. No.
92-178, which was extended to January 1, 1982 in the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of
1977, 402(a) of Pub. L. No. 95.30; the "temporary" five-year amortization for pollution con-
trol facilities (I.R.C. S 169) in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, $ 704(a) of Pub. L. No. 91-172,
which was extended to January 1, 1976 in the "Pins and Needles" Bill of 1974, 5 3(a) of Pub. L.
No. 93-625 (1975), and made permanent in 5 2112(b) of Pub. L. No. 94-455 (1976); and the
"temporary" five-year amortization for rehabilitation of low-income housing (I.R.C. S 167(k))
in 5 521(a) of Pub. L. No. 91.172 (1969), which was extended to January 1, 1976 in 5 3(c) of
Pub. L. No. 93-625 (1975), extended to January 1, 1978 in 5 203(a) of Pub. L. No. 94-455
(1976), extended to January 1, 1979 in 5 4(a) of Pub. L. No. 95-171 (1977), and extended to
January 1, 1982 in S 367 of Pub. L. No. 95-600 (1978). But compare the five-year amortization for
railroad rolling stock (I.R.C. 5 184) in 5 705(a) of Pub. L. No. 91-172 (1969), which was ex-
tended to January I, 1976 in $ 3(b) of Pub. L. No. 93-625 (1975), but which has not been further
extended; the five-year amortization for coal mining safety equipment (former I.R.C. 5 187) in
707(a) of Pub. L. No. 91-172 (1969), which was extended to January 1, 1976 in S 3(d) of Pub. L.
No. 93-625 (1975), but repealed in the "deadwood" title of Pub. L. No. 94-455 (1976),
1901(a)(31); and five-year amortization of on-the-job training facilities (formerly in I.R.C. 5
188) in 5 303 of Pub. L. No. 92-178, which was dropped when the child care provision of $ 188
was extended in Pub. L. No. 95-30 (1977).
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TABLE A*
Comparison of the Energy Tax Incentives in the Senate Version
of the Windfall Profit Tax Bill and Those Finally Approved in
Conference, with Estimated Revenue Effects, 1980-90
(Dollars in Millions)
RESIDENTIAL CREDITS:
Senate Bill Conference Agreement
Item (termination date) Cost Action
Cost of
Conference
Provision
Change In
Cost From
Senate Bill
Conservation:
15% Energy Saving Credit:
Make heat pumps
eligible (1985) $	 404 Deleted $	 0 $	 — 404
Make wood stoves
eligible (1982) 189 Deleted 0 —189
Make wood furnaces
eligible (1982) 35 Deleted 0 — 35
Make replacement oil
& gas furnaces
eligible (1985) 1,561 Deleted 0 — 1,561
Eliminate principal
residence rule (1985) 39 Deleted 0 — 39
25% credit for coal
furnaces (1982) 133 Deleted 0 —133
10% credit for
landlords (1985) 382 Deleted 0 — 382
Solar, Wind, & Geothermal:
Raise credit to 50% Raise to 40%
(2000) 4,667 through 1985 533 —4,134
Eliminate principal
residence rule (1999) 71 Deleted 0 —	 71
40% credit for landlords Deleted.' Land-
(1999) 846 lord's share of 67 — 779
15% business
credit
Builders' passive solar
credit (1985) 321 Deleted 0 — 321
Total Residential Credits: $8,668 $600 $ —8,068
Source: Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation, Conference Comparison on H.R. 3919 (Dec. 18,
1979); Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Conference Report on H.R. 3919, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
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BUSINESS INCENTIVES:
Senate Bill
	
Conference Agreement
Cost of
	
Change In
Conference	 Cost From
Item (expiration date)	 Cost	 Action	 Provision	 Senate Bill
Energy Investment Credits:
Solar & wind credit to
20% (1990)
Geothermal credit to
20% (1990)
Ocean thermal credit of
20% (1990)
Small-scale hydro,
10% credit
$ 4,251
442
311
1,086
15% through
1985
15% through
1985
15% through
1985
11% through
1985, other
changes
$1,058
29
5
1,797
$ —3,193
—413
—306
+711
Small-scale hydro, ADR
life to 20 from 50
	
92 Deleted
Cogeneration, 10% credit
(1982)	 427 Amended
Cogeneration at major fuel
burning installations (1982) 	 65 Deleted
Modifications to alumina
electrolyte cells, 10%
credit (1982)	 12 Same
Industrial heat pumps,
10% credit (1982)	 4-6 Deleted
Petroleum coke & pitch,
10% credit (1982) 	 635 Amended
Biomass, 20% credit	 10% through
(1990)	 2,886	 1985
Transition rule	 1,152 Same
Electric cars, 10% credit
(1985)	 54 Deleted
Truck wind shields, 10%
credit (1982)	 20 Deleted
Intercity buses, 10% credit
for added capacity (1985)	 36 Same
Coke ovens, 10% credit
(1982)	 277 Same
Feedstock equipment, 10%
credit (1982)
	
110 Same
Subtotal	 $11,902
Alcohol fuels
	 2,172 Amended
Alternative Fuels Credits	 167 Amended
Tertiary Injectants 	 79 Same
	
0	 — 92
	
356	 — 71
	
0	 — 65
	
12	 0
	
46	 — 46
	
532	 —103
	
648	 —2,238
	
1,152
	 0
	
0	 — 54
	
0	 — 20
	
20	 0
	
277	 0
	
110	 0
	
$6,012	 $ —5,890
	
1,574
	 —598
	
160	 — 7
	
79	 0
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Solid waste disposal facilities	 263 Amended 48 — 215
Small-scale hydro	 1,420 Amended 283 — 1,137
Alcohol from solid waste	 7 Same 7 0
State renewable resource
programs	 67 Same 67 0
Additions to certain hydro 	 66 Same 66 0
Pumped storage facilities 	 971 Deleted 0 —971
Cogeneration	 77 Deleted 0 —	 77
Subtotal, IDI3s: 	 $2,872 $	 472 $	 — 2,400
Total Business Incentives: 	 $17,192 $8,297 $	 — 8,895
Total Residential and Business
Tax Incentives:	 $25,860 $8,897 $ — 16,963
The potential for such a future reversal of the House gains is especially
great on the business side. Here, the conference cut the size of the Senate's tax
subsidies by more than half over the 1980-90 period, but the reduction through
1985 is only 26 percent. Thus, extension of effective dates could have a very
significant impact. In particular, the conference's limitation on effective dates
is crucial with respect to four major business tax credits — for solar and wind
technology, geothermal devices, ocean thermal applications, and biomass. The
conference changes in these four provisions are responsible for 69 percent of the
revenue savings achieved on the business side over the 1980-90 period. Eighty-
eight percent of this reduction, however, is due to their termination in 1985. In
contrast, their cost over the first six years of this decade was reduced by only
one-third. If it turns out that these four credits are extended through 1990, the
$8.9 billion reduction in the size of the Senate's business energy incentives
achieved, in conference could shrink by as much as $4 billion.
On the residential side, the conference reductions are not quite so depend-
ent upon termination dates. Even over the 1980-85 period, the cost of the
Senate's residential credits was slashed by 86 percent — or $4.2 billion —
primarily because the House conferees refused to accept ten energy saving
items which the Senate bill would have added to the list of those eligible for tax
breaks. On the other hand, a 1985 termination date is responsible for over 90
percent of the $4 billion conference reduction in the 1980-90 cost of one major
residential item — the residential solar, wind, and geothermal credit. If this
single tax preference is extended, as much as $3 billion of the conference cost
savings may disappear.
In sum, the $17 billion reduction in the Senate's energy incentives
achieved in conference could shrink by almost $9 billion — or over half — if
several items are extended beyond their 1985 termination date." Nevertheless,
" See the remarks of Ways and Means Chairman Al TJIInnan during the House debate
on the motion to instruct the House conferees to accept all of the Senate's energy tax incentives,
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one should not cynically denigrate the value of "sunsetting" these tax expendi-
tures. By 1985, it is likely that experience will offer better insights into the ef-
ficacy of the credits, and it is even possible that Congress will consider these in-
sights in deciding whether the credits should be extended.
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES: A CRITICAL HISTORY
A. The House Ways and Means Committee — Holding the Fort
The dramatic slashes in the size of the tax incentives from their early scope
was largely due to the disillusionment of most House Ways and Means Com-
mittee members with tax credits — and in particular energy tax credits — as ef-
fective tools to accomplish social policy goals. Disillusionment, of course, is
necessarily preceded by illusion, and, in fact, the Ways and Means Committee
had enthusiastically approved a number of tax-based subsidies for conservation
and alternative energy in 1975 — provisions which ironically failed to gain
Senate acquiescence. 19
 By 1977, however, when President Carter put forward
his National Energy Plan," with its numerous new tax incentives," many
Ways and Means members were already beginning to doubt the efficacy of
such programs." Nevertheless, in the spirit of national — and, for the
126 CoNG. REC., H1065 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980).
19
 The Energy Conservation and Conversion Act, H.R. 6860, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975), which was approved by the Ways and Means Committee and passed by the House, but
never enacted, included a 30% tax credit for up to $500 in expenditures for insulation, storm
windows, and similar conservation devices; a 25% solar credit on up to $8,000 in expenditures; a
25% electric car credit on up to $3,000 in expenditures; five-year amortization on equipment in-
volved with biomass, recycling, shale oil, coal liquification, coal slurry pipelines, solar energy,
and deep coal mining; and extension of the investment tax credit to structural components of
buildings such as insulation and solar equipment.
20 Title II of H.R. 6831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2t President Carter's energy program was centered on a proposed "crude oil equaliza-
tion tax" — in essence decontrol of oil prices with a 100% windfall tax on already discovered oil.
Id. § 1401 et seq. It also included, however, a number of tax incentives and penalties intended to
encourage conservation, alternative energy development, oil drilling, and mass transit, and to
discourage the use of oil and gas and fuel-wasting automobiles. Id., Parts A-C, E, & F. The tax
credit proposals included a residential conservation credit of 25% of the first $800 in expenditures
and 15% of the next $1,400; a residential solar energy credit of 40% of the first $1,000 in expend-
itures and 25% of the next $6,400; and a business 10% tax credit for insulation, solar energy,
and other energy saving equipment.
22 The energy program was generally seen as an embarrassment to the Treasury
Department, which was forced to defend the tax credits in spite of the fact that it was also prepar-
ing a tax reform program with simplification as a major goal. A number of Ways and Means
members pointed out the inconsistency. See, e.g. , Tax Aspects of President Carter's Energy Program:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 119 (May 1977), (state-
ment of Barber Conable (R-N.Y.)): "The evidence we have available from private and public
sources raises serious questions about the energy savings potential of this incredibly complicated
structure of taxes, rebates, credits, and so forth. . . . This, from an administration whose leader
has called the Internal Revenue Code a 'disgrace' and has repeatedly called for a promised tax
simplification."; id. at 175 (statement of Bill Frenzel (R-Minn.)): "It strikes me as being a com-
plicated program which will be bewildering to our constituents in terms of trying to weigh the in-
centives."). Others questioned the need for the credits, see, e.g., id. at 688 (statement of Andrew
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Democrats, party — unity, the Committee did approve versions of the Presi-
dent's tax credit proposals," and with some further modifications they were
ultimately adopted by the full Congress."
One of the energy tax credits endorsed by the Ways and Means Commit-
tee in 1977 was a 20% credit for home insulation." In agreeing to this provi-
sion, the Committee reluctantly ignored predictions by tax reform groups that
insulation manufacturers would take advantage of the tax break to increase
prices." When the cost of insulation went up by over 20 percent soon after
Ways and Means approval of the credit, 27 however, the Committee's an-
tagonism toward energy tax subsidies began to harden. In fact, many members
were almost ready to reconsider and withdraw the insulation tax break, but felt
trapped by their commitment to taxpayers who had paid the increased prices in
reliance on the promised federal subsidy. The members vowed, however, to
avoid the enactment of such credits in the future.
Consequently, during the 1979 Ways and Means hearings on President
Carter's proposals to provide still more energy tax credits 28 — as part of the
windfall tax legislation — energy tax incentives were the subject of much deri-
sion. For example, the existing credit for solar space heating was criticized by
Jacobs, Jr. (D-Ind.)) or questioned its design, see, e.g., id. at 170 (statement of J.J. Pickle
(D-Tex.)).
" The Committee approved a 20% residential insulation credit for the first $2,000 in
expenditures, a solar credit of 30% of the first $1,500 in expenditures and 20% of the next
$8,500, and a 10% business credit for solar and other energy saving equipment. ENERGY TAX
ACT OF 1977, REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS ON TITLE II OF H.R.
6831, H. REP. No. 95-496, Part III, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1977).
24 As finally approved by Congress, the major energy tax credits included: a 15% (up
to $300) residential conservation credit; a residential solar, wind, and geothermal of 30% of the
first $2,000 in expenditures and 20% of the next $8,000; and a 10% business energy tax credit
for solar, wind, and geothermal. Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, §§ 101, 301
(1978); I.R.C. §§ 44C, 46(a)(2), 48(1).
25 The insulation credit finally approved by Congress was set at 15%. Id.
28
 Such a likelihood was suggested in the testimony of Robert M. Brandon, Director of
Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group, before the Ways and Means Committee, The Tax
Aspects of President Carter's Energy Program: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 570, 587 (1977) (statement of Robert M. Brandon) ("As you know, just looking
at the insulation industry, they can't meet the demands created by the recent price increases in
heating oil") and later, as the problem became more obvious, pressed with more vigor in conver-
sations with members. The Federal Trade Commission made a similar prediction. See id. at 386,
400 (Letter of May 26, 1977 from Michael Pertschuk, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, to Ways and Means Chairman Al Ullman (D-Ore.)) ("The obvious effect of a sudden up-
ward shift in demand will be higher prices for fiberglass home insulation.").
27
 The cost of R-11, 3 14 " fiberglass insulation, for example, went from about 12 cents
per square foot to about 15 cents per square foot almost overnight. See 126 CONG. REC. H1069,
(daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980) (Mr. Moore: "I served on the Energy Subcommittee for 3 years. We
looked into the situation of giving tax credits then for insulation. We found only so much insula-
tion could be produced in this country and that a tax credit was not going to cause any increase in
its production. There was only so much in the marketplace to be bought and all that was going to
happen, and in fact did happen, is that the cost of those materials went up. The consumer paid
more after the credit than before.").
28
 See The President's Energy Program, Phase III: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-30 (July 20, 24, and 25, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Phase III Hear-
ings].
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Barber Conable (R-N.Y.) as "a kind of rich man's plaything.' ' 29 Sam Gibbons
(D-Fla.) satirically asked whether a proposed tax break for awnings would ap-
ply to "hats with a broad brim."" The much sought-after wood stove credit
was compared to a foolish tax break the Ways and Means Committee once had
approved for garden tools. 3 ' Representative Bill Frenzel (R-Minn.) aptly
summed up the prevailing view on the Committee with respect to energy tax
subsidies:
The principal tax credit bill we passed last year does not seem to
have given great incentive in the marketplace. . [Pleople did not
flock to take advantage of it. The tax credit tends to be a reward for
economic action that was forced by other factors. The tax credit does
not motivate, but rather simply occurs at the end of the year when
the fellow finds there was a tax credit available. And I do not think
that is a very efficient and effective stimulus."
As one pro-credit witness wistfully stated, "obviously most folks here are not
convinced tax credits work, and that they in fact expedite energy
conservation." 33 When it came time for the Committee to mark up the energy
incentive proposals, it took only about an hour for the entire package to be
literally laughed down. 34
29 Id. at 34.
30 Id. at 315.
" Id. at 314-315. In 1975, the Committee had included, and the full House had ap-
proved, a 7% tax credit on the first $100 spent by an individual taxpayer on garden tools as
1801 of H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1975, the bill which became the Tax Reform Act of
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455. According to the Committee's report, the credit was intended to help
deal with the rising cost of groceries by taking "some initiative ... in encouraging the private
production of food." H.R. REP. No. 94-658 on H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 371 (Nov.
12, 1975). The Finance Committee deleted this silly measure, "because it would add complexity
to the tax form[,] ... because the Internal Revenue Service would not be able to verify whether
people actually made the expenditures on which the credit would be based," S. REP. 94-938, ON
H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 490 (June 10, 1976), and because the provision threatened to
make a laughing stock of Congress.
" Phase III Hearings, supra note 28 at 317.
" Phase III Hearings, supra note 28 at 245.
" See The Washington Post, August 1, 1979, at 1:
Panel Laughs Off Carter Proposals For Tax Credits
By Art Pine
President Carter's proposals for $2.4 billion worth of tax credits to help spur
development of new energy sources were all but hooted out of the Capitol yester-
day by the House Ways and Means Committee.
In what was intended to be the start of a two day drafting session, panel
members took turns criticizing the package for its complexity, poking fun at in-
dividual proposals and questioning whether the credits were needed.
Members ridiculed various elements of the package, particularly tax credits
for installing wood-burning stoves and for angling solar collectors so they face the
south side of a building.
[Rep. Henson] Moore [(R-La.)] proposed a tax credit for thermal underwear.
Rep. William Brodhead (D-Mich.) raised the possibility that providing a tax break
for wood-burning stoves might make it necessary to "post guards around our
trees."
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Although the Committee's verdict against energy tax credits was virtually
unanimous, it came close to being overruled by the full House. A motion to in-
struct the House windfall conferees to accept the Senate's entire $26 billion
package of energy tax preferences failed by only a 195-207 margin, with
Democrats evenly split (131-131) and Republicans supporting the Committee's
position by a narrow margin (76-64). 35
 Many House members who usually
supported tax reform, including Toby Moffett (D-Conn.), Al Gore (D-Tenn.),
and Elizabeth Holtzman (D-N.Y.), voted in favor of adopting the Senate pro-
visions. 36
 Notably, however, only four Ways and Means members —
Representatives Thomas Downey (D-N.Y.), Wyche Fowler (D-Ga.), Frank
Guarini (D-N. J.), and Ed Jenkins (D-Ga.) — challenged the Committee's
judgment, and with the exception of Jenkins, all were first year members."
The Ways and Means Committee majority was so convinced of the ob-
vious correctness of its antagonism toward energy credits that most of the
leading opponents of the measures did not even participate in the House floor
debate on the motion to instruct the conferees. Jim Gorman (D-Cal.) did point
out some of the tax fairness and complexity problems with the Senate's tax
credit package," and Henson Moore (R-La.) perfunctorily recited an entire
litany of drawbacks to the proposed tax subsidies, 39 but neither representative
was able to communicate to the other members just how deep, broad, and well-
considered the Ways and Means Committee opposition to energy credits ac-
tually was. It was only after a motion to table the motion to instruct had failed
overwhelmingly that an "astounded" Sam Gibbons, who had been the most
effective at the Committee mark-up in ridiculing the credits, appeared on the
House floor." Combining anger and sarcasm, Representative Gibbons was
able to plead successfully with House members to defer to the judgment of the
Ways and Means conferees.'"
[Rep. Sam] Gibbons [(D-Fla.)] suggested providing a tax credit for whatever
energy might be produced by "burning the Treasury's proposals." And Rep.
Andy Jacobs (D-Ind.) branded the computation formula [for the passive solar
credit] as simple, if you could read it in the original Greek."
The thrust of the committee's objections appeared to be based on a view that
the tax credits were not needed, particularly in the wake of Carter's decision to lift
oil price controls.
The barrage of sarcasm was one of the most hostile receptions that any of
Carter's tax proposals have received from the panel. The committee was more
sympathetic to his quickly rejected plan to tax the "three martini lunch."
Id.
" 126 CoNG. REC. H 1078 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980). The instruction would have been
non-binding.
35 Id.
37 Id.
35 Id. at H1074.
35
 Id. at H 1068-69.
" Id. at H1078.
" Rep. Gibbons noted: "The gentleman from New Hampshire [NorMan D'Armours,
sponsor of the motion to instruct] wanted wood-burning stoves, and he got wood-burning stoves
and a bunch of biomass along with it." Id.
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B, The Popular Arguments for the Credits — Disappointingly Frivolous
With the exception of Ways and Means Committee members, most of the
members of Congress who publicly addressed the issue of energy tax subsidies
did so in a manner which can at best be termed disappointing. For example,
during the House floor debate on the motion to instruct the conferees to accept
the Senate's full tax incentive package, Jim Jeffords (R-Vt.) advocated a
retroactive (to April 1977) credit for wood-burning stoves — as an incentive for
what, he did not explain — and tried to justify the stoves credit as a jobs pro-
gram.'" Using similar logic, Beverly Byron (D-Md.) maintained that wood
stoves should get a tax credit because, among other things, they are already
popular" — an argument which would seem to cut the other way."
Further instances of such frivolous reasoning are commonplace in the
records of the congressional debates on the energy tax subsidies. It is probably
no coincidence that the most detailed examples of flawed analysis of the pro-
posed energy tax credits were provided by their leading champion, Senator
Bob Packwood (R-Ore.), who is also an unabashed advocate of tax subsidies
for almost everything which he perceives as good.'" In the energy area, Senator
Packwood has been heavily influenced by groups such as the Solar Lobby 46 and
books like the Harvard Business School's Energy Future." Moreover, he was
looking toward improving his standing in Oregon in preparation for his, since
successful, 1980 reelection campaign. Since the mid-1970s, Oregon, along with
other Northwest states, has faced an energy crunch, with demand for cheap
hydroelectric power beginning to outstrip supply. As part of its attempt to
avoid the expensive nuclear and coal options, the state has instituted a major
program to encourage residential conservation.'" During the Finance Commit-
4Z 126 CONG, REC. H1068 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980).
4' Id. at H 1072.
" Unless the goal is to pay people for doing what they would do anyway, subsidies for
already popular items appear to be misdirected.
" See, e.g., the exchange between myself and Senator Packwood in Charitable Contribu-
tion Deductions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate
Comm. on Finance on S.219, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 199 (1980).
Senator PACKWOOD. Generally, Public Citizen's philosophy bends
toward the simplified tax form and against tax expenditures, does it not?
MR. MCINTYRE. Yes . . .
Senator PACKWOOD. That is a respectable philosophy, but not one that I
agree with.
46 The Solar Lobby is a Washington-based public interest group which works for added
federal support for solar energy development.
47 ENERGY FUTURE: REPORT OF THE ENERGY PROJECT AT THE HARVARD BUSINESS
SCHOOL (R. Stobaugh and D. Yergin, eds., 1979) [hereinafter ENERGY FUTURE]. For a critique
of the tax proposals in this book, see R. McIntyre, A Solar Future: Tax Credits Won't Make it Happen,
but a Proposed Solar Bank Might, PEOPLE & TAXES, Feb. 1980, at 3, [hereinafter R. McIntyre, A Solar
Future], reprinted as Federal Loans Compared With Tax Credits As A Spur To Solar Energy Development,
TAX NOTES, March 10, 1980, at 315.
44 Under the "Oregon Plan," which was devised by Pacific Power & Light and has
since been implemented in Washington, Montana, and Ohio as well, the utility actually makes •
conservation investments in residential buildings. The expenditures are treated as a "zero in-
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tee's consideration of the windfall profit tax legislation, Senator Packwood at-
tempted to further Oregon's efforts by proposing a series of new energy tax
credits — many of which ended up in the Senate version of the bill. These
credits could have resulted in the federal government picking up half the tab for
Oregon's innovative program, and, in the Senator's opinion, would also have
been of great benefit to the entire country.
In promoting the various energy tax incentives which he favored, Senator
Packwood frequently pointed to the dramatic and inexpensive energy savings
which he maintained would result from their enactment. Were the Senator's
extravagant claims accurate, only a true misanthrope could have opposed his
plans. Unfortunately, in spite of the fact that many on Capitol Hill seem to
have accepted the Senator's energy savings estimates," a quick analysis shows
that they were based upon a very faulty methodology. The problems with
Senator Packwood's estimating technique can be illustrated by focussing on a
table which he distributed during the windfall profit tax conference. Entitled
Cost and Energy Savings of Renewable Energy Tax Credits (Packwood Provisions of H.R.
3919), it included a list of 13 items which the Senator had succeeded in attach-
ing to the Senate windfall bil1, 5° along with their revenue costs and his esti-
mates of the oil which they would save. To illustrate:
1980-90 Oil Saved Cost of Energy (1979
Revenue Loss by Investment Dollars To Save
PROVISION (S millions) (million barrels) A Barrel of Oil)
10% landlord credit 382 546 $ 7/barrel
Heat pumps [15% credit] 404 192 14/barrel
Those who have dealt with Senator Packwood know that he did not intend
to deceive anyone with this table. It is equally clear, however, that the table did
mislead many of those who examined it. In part, this was due both to inade-
quate labeling of the columns and to insufficient care on the part of readers. It
terest, deferred principle loan" to the homeowner, the investments are included in the utility's
rate base, and the loan is repaid only when the house is sold. The program has been in existence
since late 1978. Telephone interview by author with Gary DeLoss, Environmental Policy Center.
45 The staff of the Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee used the Packwood ap-
proach in an analysis of the energy credits in the Senate windfall profit tax bill prepared in
January of 1980, although the staff's recommendations were generally negative on the proposed
credits anyway. Staff of the Oversight Subcomm. of the House Ways and Means Comm.,
Analysis of the Energy Tax Credits in the Senate Version of H.R. 3919 (untitled) (1980)
[hereinafter OVERSIGHT ANALYSIS]. See also the statement of Rep. Floyd Fithian (D-Ind.) during
the debate on the motion to instruct the House windfall profit tax conferees to accept the entire
Senate tax incentive package, 126 CoNG. REC. H1072 (daily ed. Feb. 20, I980).•
5° The entire list of the "Packwood Provisions" included: A 10% conservation credit
for landlords; deletion of the limitation of the residential credits to primary residences; at 15%
credit for heat pumps; a 50% solar, wind, and geothermal credit for homeowners; a 40% solar,
wind, and geothermal credit for landlords; and business credits for solar and wind, geothermal,
ocean thermal, hydroelectric power, cogeneration, industrial heat pumps, and non-wood
biomass. Senator Packwood estimated the total oil savings from these provisions to be just over 4
billion barrels. Packwood, Cosi and Energy Savings of Renewable Energy Tax Credits. (Packwood Pro-
visions of H.R. 3919) (1980).
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was primarily due, however, to a method of computation so bizzare that no one
could reasonably have suspected it had been used.
The labeling problem led to a common mistake by many who quickly
perused the table. That error was to assume — in reliance on the traditional
left-to-right convention — that the "Cost of Energy" figures in the third col-
umn were the important figures, and that they had been computed on the basis
of the numbers in the first two columns. A careful reading of the footnotes to
the chart, however, indicates otherwise. Rather than having been calculated by
the Senator, these "Cost of Energy" figures actually were assumed, based on a
variety of outside sources — including, in some cases, the manufacturers of the
items which the Senator's credits would have subsidized.
The real key figures in the table turn out to be those in the second, "Oil
Saved" column. It was here that the major flaw in the Senator's analysis came
into play. To compute these figures, the Senator or his staff began with the
heroic premise that, without the tax incentives, there would be zero investment
in the items he proposed to subsidize. In other words, Senator Packwood
postulated that, in the absence of his tax credits, there would be no purchases
of heat pumps, no insulation of apartment buildings, no solar installations, no
investments in small-scale hydroelectric facilities, and so on.
Once this rather peculiar assumption was made, the calculations pro-
ceeded in a fairly straightforward manner. First, the Senator divided the
estimated revenue loss from a particular credit, listed in column one," by the
percentage rate of the credit, yielding what he apparently believed would be the
new investment induced by the credit. He then divided this figure by the
estimated cost of saving a barrel of oil using the particular process or device, as
listed in column three. For example, to compute the amount of oil which would
be saved by the 10 percent conservation credit for landlords, Senator Packwood
took the following steps. First, he divided the estimated revenue loss of $382
million by the credit rate of 0.10 to compute the alleged "induced investment"
— $3,820 million. Next, he divided this figure by the $7 per barrel cost of sav-
ing oil by conservation, which he had obtained from a June 30, 1979 Weekly
Memo (to the President) from the Administrator of the EPA. The result was a
predicted saving of 546 million barrels of oil between 1980 and 1990. Similarly,
to compute the putative energy savings from the 15 percent credit for heat
pumps, the Senator divided the $404 million estimated revenue loss by 0.15,
yielding $2.7 billion in "added" investments in heat pumps. Next, he divided
this number by $14 per barrel, a figure which he obtained from General Elec-
tric (a manufacturer of heat pumps), to yield an oil saving of 192 million bar-
rels.
Having computed these colossal energy savings, Senator Packwood then
could work backwards to show the miniscule cost to the federal government per
5 ' The revenue estimates were provided by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion.
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barrel of oil saved. The cost of the landlord credit to the Treasury, for example,
comes to a mere 70 cents per barrel of oil saved using Senator Packwood's com-
putations." For the heat pump credit, the cost per barrel is only slightly larger,
at $2.10."
Senator Packwood's assumption that there would be no investment in the
items he wanted to encourage in the absence of his tax credits, is, of course,
false. 54 To make such an assumption begs the key question — namely, what
portion of the energy credits will be spent subsidizing projects which would
have been undertaken anyway and what portion will go toward inducing addi-
tional energy saving investments. If 99 percent of the investments would be
made without the tax benefit, then Packwood's credits are obviously a very
wasteful use of the taxpayers' money. Such credits would purchase oil alter-
natives at a cost, for example, of $70 per barrel equivalent in the case of the
landlord credit and $210 per barrel in the case of heat pumps. If a much lower
percentage of the revenue loss relates to projects which would be undertaken
anyway, then the taxpayers would apparently derive greater benefit.
Somewhat ironically, the figures in the third column of Senator
Packwood's chart actually do suggest an answer to the key question of how
much investment is likely to be induced — but the answer tends to undercut
the Senator's position in support of the tax subsidies. If the Senator's assump-
tions in column three as to the costs of saving energy through the various proc-
esses he favors are accurate, then the likely amount of induced investment from
the Senator's tax credits would appear to be very small indeed, perhaps close to
zero. For example, Senator Packwood maintains that the cost of saving oil
through insulating is only $7 per barrel. If so, with the market price of crude oil
running at close to $40 per barrel and with heating oil costing well over $70 per
barrel, it is hard to see how additional price incentives, such as a 10 percent in-
sulation credit, will be helpful in encouraging conservation. The price incen-
tives are already overwhelming. As is discussed below, other programs are
available which direct themselves to what are probably the main stumbling
blocks to more investment in conservation and alternative energy.
52 This figure can be calculated by dividing the 3,820 million barrels of oil which would
allegedly be saved by "added" insulation into the $382 million estimated cost to the Treasury of
the tax credit. Alternatively, one can bypass most of Senator Packwood's calculations and simply
multiply the 10% rate of the landlord credit by the $7 per barrel cost of saving oil by insulating.
This latter method explicitly relies on Senator Packwood's fallacious assumption that without the
tax incentive there would be zero investment by landlords in apartment insulation.
" Senator Packwood did not include in his table figures on the alleged cost to the
Treasury per barrel of oil saved, but he did refer to such figures in arguing for his proposals.
Written estimates, based on Senator Packwood's table and his faulty assumptions, of the revenue
loss per barrel of oil saved were provided in a document circulated during the windfall tax con-
ference by the staff of the Ways and Means Oversight Subcommittee. OVERSIGHT ANALYSIS,
supra note 49.
54 Since the Joint Committee on Taxation staffs revenue estimates which Senator
Packwood used in his computations are based largely on current investments and trends in these
areas, the Senator's assumption is also statistically amusing.
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C. The Serious Arguments for Energy Tax Credits — Still Unpersuasive
Where the cost of a particular conservation or alternative energy device is
already much lower than the market price of oil, it seems difficult to make a
convincing argument that additional price incentives will be effective in
stimulating such alternatives. There are some serious arguments, however, for
subsidizing expensive alternative energy sources which are not cost-efficient
under current market conditions — in particular, solar energy. The first argu-
ment is that creating an artificial market for promising alternatives which are
currently too expensive can give a boost to an industry and eventually, through
the traditional learning curve, result in lower prices which are competitive with
oil." This reasoning is frequently buttressed, at least in the case of solar
energy, by claims that the major energy companies are intentionally undercut-
ting the development of alternative energy sources, motivated by their desire to
maintain the value of their oil reserves, to retain their economic power over
consumers by keeping electrical generation centralized, to protect their in-
vestments in nuclear energy, and so on. 56
A second, perhaps more compelling argument for subsidizing expensive
energy alternatives is based on the thesis that the market is not functioning
properly and that the marginal cost of the imported oil which alternatives could
displace far exceeds its average cost. 57 For example, suppose the United States
imports 8 million barrels of oil per day at $30 per barrel, for an annual cost of
$88 billion. It. is argued that a reduction of 7 million barrels per day not only
would save one-eighth of the cost — or $11 billion — but also could reduce the
price which foreign governments are able to charge for their oil — or force
them to forego otherwise possible price increases. If the price reduction were,
say, 10 percent, then a 12 1/2 percent reduction in imports could lower our
foreign oil bill by $19 billion, making the marginal cost of the last million bar-
rels per day $51 per barrel. Therefore, it is argued, it makes sense to save oil by
conservation or by production of an oil substitute such as solar energy until the
total cost per barrel-equivalent of the oil alternative exceeds $50. With a 40
percent federal subsidy, for example, solar power costing $50 per barrel of oil
saved could be made competitive with $30-per-barrel foreign oil, and the coun-
try would be better off." When the national security and international trade
balance aspects of heavy reliance on foreign oil are factored in, not to mention
the possible effects on domestic oil prices, this argument for subsidizing expen-
sive energy alternatives becomes even more powerful.
55 See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 47, at 197, 207-10.
56
 See, e.g., id. at 195-96.
" See, e.g., id. at 51-52, 196 n.36.
56 A similar argument is made frequently with regard to electric power, even where oil
is not involved. It is argued that the marginal cost of increased electric utility output — that is,
new power plants — far exceeds the average cost of production from existing plants, thereby
justifying a subsidy for alternatives to new construction of plants. This argument is the justifica-
tion for the conservation subsidies in the "Oregon Plan," supra note 48.
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If one accepts the notion that government subsidies for alternative energy
development and conservation can be well-advised in some cases, the question
still remains as to what is the best way to implement such subsidies. Proponents
of tax credits, when they choose to explain why they have selected the tax
system as their vehicle, 59 usually point to ease of administration as the primary
reason. If the goal is to hand out government funds to virtually anyone who
alleges that he or she has fulfilled the eligibility conditions, with almost no in-
vestigation of the truth of the claims, there does seem to be a modest validity to
this justification. It does appear to be somewhat cheaper for individuals to
deduct, say, $300 from their tax bills than for the government to mail $300 to
anyone who writes in and asks for it. In 1980, for example, approximately 4% 2
million individual taxpayers claimed energy credits, averaging just under
$100, on their 1979 tax returns. 60 The cost of administering a system based
upon individual requests rather than tax credits might have been as high as 1
percent of the funds disbursed, or about $5 million. 6 ' The tax route is adminis-
tratively simpler and less expensive, however, only if the government desires
neither serious checks on abuses nor serious efforts to assure that the program
achieves goals other than fund disbursement. 62
66 In ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 47, the authors, who recommend tax incentives for
alternative energy sources and conservation dozens of times in the text, offer a token disclaimer
for their fascination with tax subsidies in a lengthy footnote: "By suggesting tax credits," they
maintain, "it is not our intent to argue the merits of one policy instrument over another
. . The potential perversities of tax credits, deductions, and direct grants or subsidies,
. . . as well as the ranking of their political feasibility are beyond the scope of this work," Id. at
322, n.38. They then continue, however, by explaining the "three simple reasons" why tax
credits are their "preferred policy instrument": "(1) . . . [T]hey enjoy wide political support;
(2) the California experience [with solar tax credits] indicates that a substantial tax credit can be a
major stimulus to the adoption of solar technology; and (3) a tax credit is simple to administer,
since the fund distribution system (the Internal Revenue Service in this case) is already
operative." Id. For a refutation of each of these claims, see R. McIntyre, A Solar Future, supra note
47.
" Internal Revenue Service, 1979 Statistics of Income, Individual Income Tax
Returns (forthcoming). The 4.5 million returns represent about 5% of the individual returns
filed and about 7% of taxable returns. The total residential conservation and solar credits
claimed for 1979 were $441 million, for an average per return of $98. Claims were down from the
previous year, when 6.0 million taxpayers utilized $573 million in energy credits on their 1978
returns (for an average per return of $99). Internal Revenue Service, 1978 Statistics of Income,
Individual Tax Returns, at 87 (1981).
6i On the other hand, some people might not have taken the trouble to apply for the
federal grant if a separate application were required, which could mean that the tax credit is ac-
tually more expensive.
62 Cf. Kurtz, Notes to a New Commissioner of Internal Revenue, TAX NOTES, June 1, 1981,
at 1199:
Incentives supplied through the tax system too often are attractive to
lawmakers because they are seen as efficient, simple, and costless. They are said to
be efficient and simple compared to similar direct expenditure programs because
the tax incentives seem relatively free of red tape. But red tape is only a name ap-
plied to controls . . . The absence of red tape, in other words, results not from
the decision to use the tax system but rather from a decision to dispense with most
standards and controls.
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The conflict between the alleged simplicity of energy tax incentives and
the countervailing need for "bureaucratic" controls of subsidy programs can
be illustrated by looking at President Carter's proposed $2,000 tax credit for
builders of passive solar dwellings." This plan — the goal of which has par-
ticular appeal" — originally was drafted as a tax subsidy almost by happen-
stance. When pressed, however, its proponents have argued that the tax credit
approach is preferable because many builders would be reluctant to take the
time and effort to apply for a direct federal subsidy, while a tax credit is so in-
trinsically uncumbersome that more builders would take advantage of it.
Those who would prefer a direct subsidy in this area argued that Internal
Revenue Service agents are unqualified to judge whether a building meets
passive solar standards, even in the unlikely event that a builder is audited, and
that more stringent controls are necessary for a successful program." They
would allow the subsidy only after a solar expert has inspected both the plans
and the completed building to be sure that the project qualified. 66
On balance, the arguments for direct, rather than tax subsidies for the
construction of passive solar dwellings appear to be persuasive; 67 yet providing
a $2,000-per-building direct expenditure received little initial consideration. 68
One reason, of course, was jurisdictional. Once a tax subsidy proposal is before
the Ways and Means or Finance Committee, the members of the committee
have no power to convert it into a direct spending program. They can only ac-
cept or reject it." Another factor is that added federal spending — other than
for defense or corporate subsidies — is currently unpopular in many quarters.
63 See Phase III Hearings, supra note 28, at 20.
64 There is some evidence that the extra cost of passive solar construction for single-
family homes is about $2,000 per residence — a trivial amount compared to the potential energy
savings — but that builders do not believe they can recover this extra cost from homebuyers. See
e.g., Phase III Hearings, supra note 28, at 54-58.
" See, e.g., R. McIntyre, A Solar Future, supra note 47, at 8.
66 Id. Opponents of writing a blank check for homebuilders also pointed to the high
percentage of "aggressive" taxpayers in the real estate industry, and consequent need for
especially careful surveillance, which the IRS would have great difficulty supplying.
67 Although it proposed the $2,000 passive solar subsidy in the form of a tax credit, the
Carter administration apparently understood the need for quality and performance controls.
Trying to draft such standards for inclusion in the Internal Revenue Code, however, proved dif-
ficult. See note 138 infra and accompanying text.
68 The Solar and Conservation Bank Act does authorize direct subsidies to builders of
passive solar dwellings of up to 40% of the added cost, S 512 of Pub. L. No. 96-294 (1980).
69 In rejecting the passive solar credit in the windfall profit tax bill, the Ways and
Means conferees acted in part on the advice of their Oversight Subcommittee staff that the plan
was "a good concept, but better done as a direct spending program." OVERSIGHT ANALYSIS
supra note 49. The Carter Administration failed to take the hint, however, and instead endorsed
the tax expenditure approach again in September of 1980. See Passive Solar Credit Draws Broad Sup-
port, TAX NOTES, Sept. 15, 1980, at 547. The measure did not pass Congress in 1980, but has
been reintroduced in the 97th Congress as S. 498. See Staff of the Joint Comm. on Taxation,
DESCRIPTION OF MISCELLANEOUS ENERGY TAX BILLS 8-12, June 11, 1981.
In connection with the 1977 energy legislation, the House attempted to deal with the
jurisdictional problem by establishing an ad hoc energy committee to reconcile the various tax and
non-tax proposals. The Senate did not use such a unified approach. See Surrey & McDaniel, The
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In spite of over ten years of learning on the tax expenditure concept, there are
many who mistakenly continue to see tax spending as somehow cheaper than
direct outlays. 7 °
Although members of the tax-writing committees typically do not have a
direct spending option before them when a tax expenditure for a meritorious
cause, which might be better served by a conventional appropriation,n is pro-
posed, the situation was quite different when Congress debated the energy
Tax Expenditure Concept and the Legislative Process, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 136-37 (Aaron
& Boskin eds. 1980).
7° This view of the cost of tax expenditures is, of course, untrue. Consider a simple ex-
ample: Assume there are only two taxpayers, A and B, each contributing $100 to support the
government. The government decides to give A a $40 subsidy for some activity. To do so with
direct spending, it would have to raise an additional $40 in revenue, which presumably would
come in equal measure from A and B. If the government decides to use a tax expenditure ap-
proach, it still needs to recover the $40 in lost revenue. The sources from whom it can do so are
still A and B. In fact, tax expenditures actually tend to be more costly to the government than
direct spending, assuming that the former are tax-exempt and the latter are taxable. A recent
publication by the Treasury's Office of Tax Analysis explains the reason why this is true:
Max subsidy programs almost always involve higher resource costs than direct
subsidy programs that stimulate the subsidized activity to the same degree. Tax-
able [direct] subsidy payments stimulate productive activity in the same way as
higher revenues from the sale of products in the market. Producers, in both cases,
experience an increase in their before-tax returns, and the resulting increase in
after-tax returns depends upon their particular marginal tax brackets. In other
words, taxable subsidy payments, like income from the sale of goods on the
market, provide lower after-tax returns to high bracket than to low bracket tax-
payers.
Tax-exempt subsidy payments can be set at a level sufficient to provide the
same increase in income after tax as a market payment or a taxable subsidy only to
producers in one particular marginal tax bracket. If a producer is in a higher marginal tax
bracket than this break-even bracket, tax-exempt payments provide a higher after-
tax return than that available from market payments. Thus, if the tax-exempt sub-
sidy is high enough to induce low bracket producers to engage in the subsidized ac-
tivity, it would provide high income, high bracket taxpayers with a greater after-
tax return than they would require from the market. The costs of these higher-
than-required payments to high income producers do not arise in the case of tax-
able subsidies; it is for this reason that tax-exempt subsidies are a less effective and
more costly subsidy mechanism.
Office of Tax Analysis, Dept. of the Treasury, THE USE OF TAX SUBSIDIES FOR THE COST OF
COMPLIANCE WITH SAFETY AND HEALTH REGULATIONS 23 (January, 1981).
Tax expenditures tend to raise the general tax burden, for the majority who do not
benefit from the subsidies, just as much as or more than do direct spending programs. In spite of
this apparent fact, many "spending cutters," or those who pose as such, are strong supporters of
tax expenditures. See, e.g. , the Republican Platform for 1980, reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. 510379
a seq. (daily ed., July 31, 1980), which includes proposals for new tax expenditures totalling over
$100 billion a year, while at the same time calling for' less spending, and a balanced budget."
Id. at 510393.
" With tax expenditures running at an estimated $266 billion for fiscal 1982, see
COMM. — TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 15, or about 28% of total direct and tax-
implemented federal spending, it may no longer be appropriate to call direct outlays more "con-
ventional" than tax spending. (The Reagan administration is estimating about $700 billion in
direct spending in fiscal 1982. Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revi-
sions 124 (Mar., 1981).
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credits put forward for inclusion in the windfall profit tax bill. In fact, a stark
confrontation between direct spending programs and tax expenditures actually
did exist. Working their way through other congressional committees at the
same time that the energy credits were being weighed were plans to establish a
Solar and Conservation Bank, designed to work with local lending institutions
and utilities in providing reduced rate loans for solar and conservation installa-
tions." As finally approved by Congress, the Bank will make direct grants to
lenders which can cut monthly payments on such loans by 20 to 50 percent for
conservation projects and 40 to 60 percent for solar devices." For example, if
an individual seeks a $10,000 loan to install a solar heating system, the Solar
Bank might provide a grant to the lender of $5,000, so that the payments of the
loan would be cut from $120 per month to only $60 (on a 15-year note with an
interest rate of 12 percent).
Given the budget constraints facing Congress, it was obvious during the
windfall tax debate that the Bank would be competing with the energy tax
credits for funds. 74 It also seems apparent that directing federal subsidies
" Enacted as Title V of Pub. L. No. 96-294 (1980).
" The maximum grants to lenders which the Solar and Conservation Bank can provide
are as follows:
Conservation loans:
I. For owners and tenants of 1-4 unit buildings, the subsidies are limited to borrowers
with incomes less than or equal to 150% of the median income in their area. For those who
qualify, the maximum subsidies are as follows:
Income level of borrower
Maximum Subsidy Levels
Percent 1 unit 2 units 3 units 4 units
Less than 80% of median
80 to 100% of median
100 to 120% of median
120 to 150% of median
50%
35%
30%
20%
$1,250
875
750
50
$2,000
1,390
1,200
800
52,750
1,915
1,650
1,100
$3,500
104022:4
1,440
2. For commercial buildings or residential buildings with more than 4 units, the maxi-
mum subsidy is 20% of the cost, with a dollar cap of $5,000 for commercial buildings and $400
per unit for residential buildings.
Solar loans:
1, For owners or tenants of residential buildings, the maximum subsidies are as
follows:
Maximum Subsidy Levels
Income level of borrower 	 Percent	 1 unit	 2 units	 3-4 units	 Over 4 units 
Less than 80% of median	 60%	 $5,000	 $7,500	 $10,000	 $2,500/unit
80 to 160% of median	 50%
Over 160% of median	 40%
2. For commercial buildings, the maximum subsidy is 40% of the cost, with a $100,000
cap.
Summary: S. 932, Energy Security Act As Agreed to by the Senate-House Conferees on June 16,
1980, 126 CONG. REC. S7404, 7407 (daily ed., June 19, 1980).
" The competition between the Bank and the tax credits continues. In its first economic
message, the Reagan administration proposed elimination of the Bank, because "Islubstantial
economic incentives already exist for [solar and conservation) investments as a result of rising
energy prices and significant tax credits for residential energy conservation improvements (15%)
726	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:705
through the Bank has many advantages over using the tax expenditure route.
First, tax credits generally do not assist lower-income homeowners — of whom
there are a surprisingly large number" — since they pay little or no income
tax. This is not only unfair, but inefficient, since lower-income homeowners
are exactly the ones for whom financial barriers may be the most substantial —
even for cost-effective energy projects. In contrast, a loan program can reach
such people in many instances, especially if they can provide security in the
form of a second mortgage.
Second, since tax credits pay only a portion of the cost of installing a solar
system or insulation, homeowners and businesses still need to negotiate loans
— or come up with large amounts of cash — to pay the remaining cost of their
projects. Further, especially in the case of individuals, a tax credit typically
provides a benefit only when a tax return is filed and a refund is paid, which
may take place as much as a year and a half after expenditures are made. This
means that interim financing may be needed. In contrast, the Solar and Con-
servation Bank's direct subsidies are immediately and directly tied to financ-
ing. Moreover, this direct subsidy program should make banks and savings
and loan associations more interested in setting up solar and conservation loan
programs, since it most likely will create a substantial market.
Third, there are very serious problems, especially in the case of solar
power, in assuring that a system is installed correctly. In a 1978 study of 100
solar water heating installations in New England, only 15 percent were found
to have operated properly in their first year. A variety of problems, with such
things as pipes, valves, controllers, and the sizing of the units — primarily in-
stallation difficulties — were said to be the cause of the poor results. 76 Yet tax
credits, because of their "simple" administrative system, tend to preclude
safeguards against homeowner ignorance and poor installation, providing no
means of policing installers or their methods. In contrast, the act establishing
the Solar and Conservation Bank includes numerous safeguards designed to
maximize the energy savings from the program. For example, local banks are
required to have an energy audit performed on a building before a loan can be
granted. From this audit, it can be determined whether other measures, such
as the installation of more cost-effective insulation, must be taken before the
and solar technology measures (40%). There is no reason to create yet another Federal program
with Federal overhead to promote these same objectives." America's New Beginning: A Program for
Economic Recovery, 4-24 (Feb. 18, 1981).
75
 According to the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, in 1977, 48.6% of
households with incomes between $7,000 and $9,999 owned their own homes, and 67.1% of the
households in the $10,000 to $14,999 income class were home owners. Staff of the Joint Comm.
on Taxation, BACKGROUND AND ISSUES REGARDING H.R. 3712, May 25, 1980, at 22. The
current income tax liability of a typical family of four with $10,000 in income is only $372, which
does not allow very much against which to offset energy tax credits.
76
 Robert 0. Smith and Associates, Summary of Performance Problems of 100 Residential
Solar Water Heaters installed by the New England Electric Company subsidiaries in 1976-77, Boston, 1978,
summarized in ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 47, at 320 n.31.
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solar installation loan will be approved." In addition, installations will have to
be inspected to assure that they work. Warranties on performance also will be
required. An installer's credentials will have to be established, and those with
bad records can be effectively prohibited from working on subsidized
projects. 78
Furthermore, unlike "blind" tax credits, the Bank's board can allocate
funds toward energy-saving methods with the greatest potential, and can vary
the subsidy levels — subject to the legislative maximums — to take account of
the amounts needed for different types of conservation and solar techniques
and by loan applicants with different income levels." Lastly, the Bank is re-
quired to engage in a major program of publicity and promotion, in which it
will be assisted by local lenders and utilities. 80 To stimulate some of the more
cost-effective energy-saving techniques, publicity may be virtually all that is
needed. 81
77 This is a crucially important requirement. Suppose, for example, that the price of a
barrel of oil is $30, the cost of saving a barrel by conservation is $6-15, and the cost to produce a
barrel equivalent by solar power is $16-50, depending upon technique and geographic area. If
the government provides a 40% subsidy for solar power, thereby making the most expensive
solar competitive with oil, it has not only provided windfalls for some solar users, it has also made
less expensive solar more attractive than conservation in many instances. It is therefore of some
importance that applicants for energy subsidies be required to use the cheapest available oil sav-
ing techniques first, before a subsidy is granted for a more expensive one. Cf. the remarks of Rep.
J , J. Pickle (D-Tex.) in Tax Aspects of President Carter's Energy Program: Hearings Before the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 170 (1977):
Now with respect to insulation and solar equipment, I am not sure how you
would work it. I express a feeling that perhaps we ought to give these credits . . .
only if you put in the insulation first.
It seems to me that credits would be dependent on insulation. I don't know
if we benefit a whole lot if we don't insulate these homes at the beginning; it may be
tied together but I think that is a point we ought to be certain of, otherwise we defeat
ourselves. If you put in equipment and if the house is not prepared to receive it, we
waste energy.
One of the more intriguing tax credit proposals, put forward by Kaiser Aluminum and
sponsored by Rep. Cecil Heftel (D-Ha.) and Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), attempts to
avoid the windfall problem but fails to ensure that the cheapest techniques will be used first. It
establishes complicated rules, based on rate of return on investment, so that subsidies are
available only to non-cost-effective projects. Yet, as the Treasury pointed out in opposition to the
bill, the measure would provide a perverse incentive to "gold plate" the cost of projects and to
choose expensive over cheap energy-saving methods. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Taxation
and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance on S. 3006, The Industrial Energy And
Efficiency Fuel Conversion Tax Incentive Act of 1980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 29, 1980). The con-
cept might be better implemented in a direct spending program, where "bureaucrats" could use
their discretion to avoid such unwelcome results.
78
 Pub. L. No. 96.294, 515 (1980).
79
" Id. at 5 518.
" See Tax Aspects of President Carter's Energy Program: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 688 (1977) (statement of Rep. Andrew Jacobs, Jr.) ("Try
this out: The average house which is not now insulated, . . . if the overhead were insulated, it
might bring about as much as one-third savings in the consumption of fuel . . Now it seems
to me that the average rational person — and I believe that is most people in this country — who
understand that if they could finance it, get it done some way or other, they would probably do
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Administering an alternative energy subsidy program through the Solar
and Conservation Bank thus has several advantages over routing the subsidies
through the tax code. The Bank can provide funds for energy saving regardless
of the irrelevant factor of an individual's tax liability; its subsidies are timely
and are integrated with financing; it can monitor the effectiveness of the
various conservation and alternative energy measures used; and it can allocate
funds in accordance with priorities and need. All of these benefits are beyond
the ken or the inclination of the Internal Revenue Service, which administers
tax credits.
Besides the clear advantages of the Solar and Conservation Bank loan pro-
gram, another drawback to the use of tax-based alternative energy subsidies is
illustrated by the most recent data on the use of the energy tax credits enacted
in 1978. 82 This evidence suggests that the tax expenditure approach may be
less effective in inducing alternative energy use and conservation than even its
harshest critics had originally thought. On the residential side, energy credits
were claimed on only 7 percent of individual returns for 1978, and on only 5
percent for 1979. 83 The consensus is that almost all of these claims were for ex-
penditures which would have been made anyway."
On the business side, where the proponents of energy tax incentives have
been most optimistic, the response has been even more disappointing. Accord-
ing to the tax credit enthusiasts, while individual homeowners may fail to cal-
culate properly the advantages of alternatives to oil or may face obstacles in ob-
taining access to capital, corporate enterprises can be expected to give full
weight to tax incentives as they make the cold economic decisions to invest in
the areas which will maximize their profits. As a commentator in Energy Future
confidently noted, "To such signals [as tax credits] businessmen habitually
respond. " 85 Furthermore, there have been claims that business has shown more
sensitivity than have individuals to the increasing price of energy since 1973, 86
that. That would be quite an incentive if they thought about it . . . . That is, an incentive
without a tax credit is what I am saying."). Cf. id, at 601 (statement of Robert M. Brandon) (The
credit "probably provides more of a psychological stimulus than anything else. "); id. (statement
of William Pietz) ("We think a smaller credit would probably achieve about as much as the
larger credit because the mere presence of it and the impacts as a psychological gimmick which
would be seized upon by advertisers.").
82 Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618 (1978).
" See note 60, supra.
84 See, e.g., the views of Rep. Bill Frenzel (R-Minn.), in Phase III Hearings, supra note
19, at 317, and Rep. Henson Moore (R-La.), 126 CONG. REC. H 1069 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980).
' 5
 ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 47, at 181.
86 Testifying on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce in mid-1979, Edwin S. Cohen
maintained that, since 1973, business and industry had reduced their total consumption of
energy by almost 17%, while increasing output by over 21 %. Phase III Hearings, supra note 28, at
303. According to the Treasury Department, however, energy used per dollar of constant-dollar
Gross National Product (GNP) has been declining steadily since its peak year of 1970 in both the
economy as a whole and in the industrial sector. The decline was 11.8% in industry and 11.4%
in the economy as a whole, hardly a significant difference. In spite of the increased efficiency,
overall energy use increased by 17.6% in the economy overall and 13.7% in the industrial sector.
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and acceptance of such contentions may be what prompts tax credit proponents
to conclude that business also will have a stronger reaction to tax incentives.
So far, however, the corporate community's response to energy tax credits
has been almost nonexistent. The 1978 Energy Tax Act provided a 10 percent
tax credit — in addition to the existing 10 percent investment credit — for
business investments in solar, wind, and geothermal equipment. 87 Only 2,223
corporations applied for this credit in 1979 and only 6,506 applied in 1980. 88 Its
Cost to the Treasury was a meager $1.7 million in the first year and $8.3 million
in the second. 89 Similarly, the 50 percent increase in the business solar, wind,
and geothermal credit to 15 percent — enacted in the windfall profit tax
act9° is also unlikely to stimulate a significant increase in business use of alter-
native energy. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated the
revenue cost of this change to be only $10 million in 1980 and $19 million in
1981
Two mistaken responses to this data on the low utilization of the business
energy credits are possible. Some observers might adopt a "who cares" at-
titude — that is, they might feel that since the credits cost so little, a great deal
of concern over their enactment is unwarranted. Conversely, proponents of the
credits have predictably maintained that the data merely indicate that the
credit rate was, and remains, too low."
To those who may be sanguine about the cost of the credits based upon the
historical record, a closer look is recommended. What the Joint Committee
staff estimates indicate is not that the credits will always be low in cost, but that
they are unlikely to result in investments in expensive and experimental alter-
native energy projects until the market dictates that those investments are safe
and should be made. When those market signals do occur, as oil prices con-
tinue to rise and alternative energy technology advances, such investments
should increase. This view apparently underlies the Joint Committee staff's
estimates of the longer-term costs of the various business tax credits, which
show dramatic increases in the future. 92 The 15 percent solar and wind credit,
Furthermore, the average annual improvement in efficiency in the industrial sector since 1973
was only 1.2%, compared to 1.5% in the economy as a whole. See Tax Cut Proposals: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, 106 (July 23, 1980) (statement of G.
William Miller, Secretary of the Treasury).
87 Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618 (1978), S 301; I.R.C. SS 46, 48.
" Internal Revenue Service, 1978 Statistics of Income, Corporate Income Tax Returns
(forthcoming); Internal Revenue Service, 1979 Statistics of Income, Corporate Income Tax
Returns (forthcoming). There are over a million active corporations in the country.
" Id. The average credit claimed in 1979 (for tax year 1978) was $772. In 1980 (for tax
year 1979), it was $1,277.
9° Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 5 221 (1980).
91 See, e.g., ENERGY FUTURE, supra note 47, at 228, 230 n.23; Phase III Hearings, supra
note 28, at 190-91 (statement of Sheldon H. Cady, Mineral Insulation Manufacturers' Associa-
tion, Inc.).
92 Cf. FEDERAL TAX REFORM FOR 1976 (Surrey, McDaniel, & Pechman eds. 1976), at
168-69 ("The [initial] cost [of a solar tax credit] will be minor because the credit will be almost
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for example, is expected to cost $497 million by 1985. 93
 The 10 percent biomass
credit is said to cost virtually nothing through 1983, but is predicted to jump to
$352 million in 1985. 94
Those who advocate higher credits have failed to learn the lesson which
should have been taught by our experience with other business tax incentives.
The investment tax credit, for example, is supposed "to increase the nation's
productive capacity by enlarging the capital stock,"" particularly when the
economy is slack." In spite of the credit, however, investment as a share of the
GNP has been remarkably stable, 97
 and variations in investment levels have
paralleled demand, just as they did before the enactment of the credit." The
best evidence indicates that the main effects of this enormous tax expenditure99
have been to reward companies for doing what they would have done
anyway'°° and to change the allocation of the capital stock in ways which have
hindered productivity growth: 131
 The investment tax credit has certainly been
totally ineffective. But .
	 . as the technical problems of solar energy are solved . . . the
revenue losses from the solar energy credit could become very large. Thus, the credit, which fails
to spur energy research now when we face difficult technological problems, constitutes a fiscal
time bomb set to go off as soon as those problems are solved and government help is no longer
needed.").
93
 CRUDE OIL WINDFALL PROFIT TAX ACT OF 1980; CONF. REP. TO H.R. 3919, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1980).
94 Id.
95
 A. Auerbach and L. Summers, The Investment Tax Credit: An Evaluation, Har-
vard Institute of Economic Research (Nov. 1978), reprinted in Investment Credit Hearings, supra note
3, at 416. See Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 166 (statement of Emil M. Sunley, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy); id. at 347 (statement of Allen Sinai).
96
 See, e.g. , Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 432 (statement of Alan J. Auerbach
and Lawrence H. Summers).
97
 See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, Table B-86, col. 1, p. 331 (Jan. 1981).
96 See, e.g., id., columns 1 and 2 (showing a rough correlation between business invest-
ment levels and capacity utilization rates); Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 343 (state-
ment of Robert Eisner).
99
 The investment tax credit is estimated to reduce federal revenues by $20.6 billion in
fiscal 1981. JT. COMM. — TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 11-12.
1 " See, e.g., Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 345 (statement of Robert Eisner)
("The current 10-percent credit goes to firms in major part for equipment investment that they
would have undertaken anyway, without the credit"); id. at 161 (statement of Emil M. Sunley)
("repealing the investment credit [in 1969] did not have a major impact on the total amount of
investment").
101 Id. at 439 (statement of Alan J. Auerbach and Lawrence Summers) ("[T]he invest-
ment tax credit has had and continues to have an undesirable effect on the economy. The
primary long-run effect of the credit is to reallocate capital from structures to equipment.").
Because the investment credit is heavily biased against long-lived assets, it distorts the allocation
of investment in favor of shorter-lived equipment. See Bradford, Tax Neutrality and the Investment
Tax Credit, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (H. Aaron and M. Boskin, eds: 1980) at 281, 295,
298; Harberger, Tax Neutrality in Investment Incentives, in id., at 299; Sunley, Tax Neutrality between
Capital Services Provided by Long-Lived and Short-Lived Assets, in U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, OTA
PAPERS, VOL. 1: COMPILATION OF OTA PAPERS (1978). Dale Jorgenson and Martin Sullivan
have found "the loss in efficiency of capital allocation due to differences in effective tax rates
among assets" — a result primarily due to the investment tax credit — to be "very large,"
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a very significant factor in the continuing shift of the tax burden away from cor-
porations,'° 2 but this is not a goal usually emphasized by proponents of the
credit — although, for many, it may be the primary intent.
Even with historical data such as that available on the 1978 business and
residential energy credits, it will never be possible to resolve conclusively
disputes about their efficacy.'" The evidence does suggest, however, that alter-
native approaches should be tried. Serious solar advocates were concerned,
therefore, when for a time it appeared that the enactment of expanded energy
tax credits might prevent the Solar and Conservation Bank — the leading alter-
native — from granting most loans. This was because the anti-"double-
dipping" rule in the legislation establishing the Bank reduces the loan subsidy
by the amount of any tax credits for which an applicant can qualify. 01 4 At
the last minute, however, the legislative language of the tax provisions was
amended to allow taxpayers who want subsidized loans to waive their eligibility
for the tax credits.'"
The pendency of the Solar and Conservation Bank bill during congres-
sional consideration of the energy tax credit proposals was without doubt a key
factor in Congress's ultimate decision to enact only relatively small increases in
the existing tax credits.'" This points out an important tactical lesson for those
lowering the marginal return on investment by almost half in some years. D. Jorgenson and M.
Sullivan, Inflation and Corporate Capital Recovery 42 (Harvard Institute of Economic
Research, March 1981).
102 The investment credit is estimated to reduce corporate taxes by $17.3 billion in fiscal
1981. JT. COMM. — TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 11-12. This represents just over half of
the current cost of the various corporate tax reductions enacted in the 1970's. (Other major cor-
porate reductions included the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) export subsidy
— I.R.C. 55 991 et seq.; establishment of the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) depreciation rules
— Treas. Reg. 5 1.167(a)-11, as authorized by Pub. L. No. 92-178, 5 109 (1971); and various
rate cuts). Overall, effective corporate tax rates were reduced by over 30% during the 1970's. As
a result, the corpor:ate share of the federal tax burden dropped from 19.5% in 1969 to 14.1% in
1979 — although pre-tax corporate profits as a share of GNP increased over that period. See Presi-
dent Reagan's Tax Proposals: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981) (statement of Robert S. McIntyre). The Reagan administration predicts that the
corporate income tax will carry only 7.7% of the federal tax load by fiscal 1986, due primarily to
the administration's proposal to cut corporate taxes by another $50 billion a year through
depreciation changes. Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions 122
(March, 1981).
103 Cf. R. BIRD, INVESTMENT INCENTIVES: THE STATE OF THE ART (1980) (Like most
commentators, Bird has a dim view of the efficacy of tax incentives. He is also resigned, however,
to the fact that "yet another report concluding that most investment ]tax] incentives have been
tried and found wanting" will have little success in "dampening the enthusiasm of the advocates
of such devices." Id. at 2.).
1 °4 Pub. L. No. 96-294, 5 515 (1980).
1 ° 5 Pub. L. No. 96-223, 55 203, 223 (1980); I.R.C. 55 44C(c)(10), 48(1)(11).
1 ° 6 See, e.g. , Rep. Henson Moore's statement on the House floor during the debate on a
motion to instruct the House windfall profits tax conferees to accept all of the energy credits in the
Senate bill:
We already have grants in other bills; we already have loans; we already have a
number of incentive programs to help people develop new forms of energy . . .
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who generally oppose tax expenditures: If the goal of a tax preference is ob-
viously meritorious, but the tax route is — as is usually the case — a poor way
to further that goal, it is important not only to try to devise a more effective
direct spending approach but also to attempt to further the passage of such a
program in the appropriate congressional committees. Unless a direct spend-
ing program is seen as politically feasible as well as theoretically attractive,
many members of the tax-writing committees will remain inclined to accept the
second-best tax expenditure approach as the only solution available to them.
III. BEYOND TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
The preceding discussion includes a fair summary of most of the
arguments presented to Congress in favor of or in opposition to the various
energy tax preferences under consideration for inclusion within the windfall
profit tax legislation. Implicitly or explicitly, virtually all of these contentions
fit snugly within the framework of what is known as tax expenditure analysis.
That is, it was generally conceded by both proponents and opponents that the
tax credit proposals were substitutes for direct spending programs, and that
they should be analyzed as such.
It is somewhat difficult to imagine the supporters of the energy tax
preferences defending their proposals as anything but tax-based spending pro-
grams. Certainly it would have have been ludicrous to have tried to justify
them as an appropriate means of measuring the decline in real incomes suf-
fered by those who enlisted as soldiers in the moral equivalent of war against
excessive use of foreign oil. Such a justification would have been even stranger
in light of the fact that most of the tax provisions under consideration were in
the form of credits against tax liability rather than deductions from taxable in-
come. It is basic that a credit cannot be the correct tool for accurately measur-
ing income.'"
The general concession that the proposed energy preferences should be
analyzed as tax expenditures may seem trivial, but it actually represents an
unusual phenomenon. In the more typical case, there is a great deal of
categorical confusion between assertions about the proper way to measure real
incomes and arguments about the best way, if any, to encourage socially useful
So we are going to have a duplication, if we are not careful, of giving tax credits for
things that are happening anyway and are already subsidized or stimulated.
126 CONG. REC. H1069 (daily ed., Feb. 20, 1980).
i°7
 To illustrate: Legitimate business expenses ought to be deductible in computing net
income. A credit system could not yield such a fair result, given progressive tax rates. For exam-
ple, if the business expense deduction were replaced with a 40% credit for such expenses, a tax-
payer with $50,000 in gross earnings and $20,000 in expenses would have only about one-third
the tax liability of a taxpayer with $100,000 in gross income and $70,000 in expenses. This point
is explored at greater length in M.J. McIntyre, Evaluating the New Tax Credit for Child Care and
Maid Service, TAX NOTES, May 23, 1977, at 7.
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behavior, i°8 Sometimes the disagreement about the proper characterization of
a particular tax provision — as either a tax expenditure or a tool to help
measure income properly — represents a genuine, good faith dispute. For ex-
ample, the charitable deduction is defended by Professor Andrews as a proper
adjustment in determining taxable income.'" His view is based on the plausi-
ble conclusion that funds given away constitute neither consumption nor sav-
ings on the part of the donor."° In contrast, Professor McDaniel criticizes the
199 For a thorough demystification of the confusion often encountered between tax ex-
penditure and income measurement analysis see M.J. McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Defining
a Tax Expenditure, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 79 (1980) [hereinafter M.J. McIntyre]. My brother
notes that disputes over whether a particular tax provision is a tax expenditure or is rather a
"normal" tax rule incorrectly assume that the intrinsic nature of the provision in question should
determine the analytical framework in which to evaluate it. He argues that a more fruitful ap-
proach would be to eschew a priori decisions as the proper mode of analysis, and instead in each
case to use the analytical method which responds to how a provision is defended. Id, at 94. In
other words, "the bare assertion that the tax rule under examination promotes a spending goal
[should] trigger a tax expenditure analysis," but only for the purpose of evaluating whether the
provision in fact promotes that spending goal in an efficient and acceptable manner. Id. at 100.
"[A] tax expenditure analysis of . . arguments [that a rule is appropriate in defining 'income,'
on the other hand,] would be a useless frivolity." Id. at 98. If a tax provision is convincingly
defended on income measurement grounds, he suggests, tax expenditure analysis is both un-
necessary and inappropriate. Id. at 94-95.
The application of tax expenditure analysis only to tax expenditure arguments completely
avoids the up-until-now controversial problem of defining what is a tax expenditure and what is a
"normal" tax rule. The insight which this approach offers also helps cut through the intentional
smokescreens, frequently created by proponents of tax provisions, which cannot adequately be
justified on either tax policy or spending grounds. See, e.g., the discussion in note 115 infra.
109 See note 110 infra.
110 See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax. 86 HARV. L. REV. 309 (19721
Under this analysis, the only rationale for not allowing deductions for all gifts and taxing them to
the donees is administrative convenience.
While Andrews' approach provides a defensible explanation of the proper treatment of
charitable donors, the issue remains as to the proper treatment of the charitable organizations
themselves — namely, whether charities should be allowed to pay no taxes on gifts received
(assuming those gifts are deductible by the donors).
An income measurement analysis would start with the threshhold question of whether
charities should be taxed under a comprehensive income tax. Would such a tax on charities be a
proxy for taxing the recipients of the charities' largesse, much as the corporate income tax acts as
a rough proxy for taxing shareholders on retained earnings (i.e., savings)? In other words, from
an analytical perspective, are recipients of gifts from charities the proper taxpayers, since they are
the ones who actually consume the funds? But if so, given the presumably low tax brackets of
many of said recipients, would a "proxy" tax on charities properly be at a very low rate? Moving
further, should administrative expenses be deductible? If a charity uses all its gross "income" to
provide information to the general public, are the newly-informed the proper taxpayers, or has
the charity spent its entire "income" on administrative costs and is its "net income" therefore
zero? Would this mean that only organizations which provide grants to individuals should be
treated as having taxable income (based upon the proxy theory)? Should charities with a poor
clientele (orphanages) be taxed at a lower rate than those who cater to the more affluent
(museums)? The proper answers to these and certainly other questions might cause one to con-
clude that the tax exemption for charity is sensible under an income measurement analysis.
Alternatively, the tax-exempt status of charities might be defended on spending
grounds. Is tax exemption the most appropriate way for government to subsidize such organiza-
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write-off for donations to charity on the ground that it is an upside-down sub-
sidy which favors wealthy taxpayers and their chosen causes."' What is
sometimes not understood is that, if Professor Andrews is right, Professor
McDaniel's argument is irrelevant.'" If Professor Andrews is wrong, then the
focus should be concentrated on Professor McDaniel's tax expenditure
analysis, which some maintain still results in a favorable report on the
charitable deduction.
At the legislative level, proponents of a particular tax measure frequently
resist the "tax expenditure" label in an attempt to gain a tactical advantage or
to defuse criticism. The former chairman of the Senate Finance Committee,
Russell Long (D-La.), for example, used to rail against acceptance of the tax
expenditure concept," 3 due in part to his fear that the jurisdiction of his com-
mittee might suffer were its legislative proposals generally seen in this light." 4
In addition, lobbyists for new tax benefits usually make great efforts to
characterize their proposals as necessary to reflect income properly or to deal
with some defect in•the normative income tax rules, while simultaneously ex-
plaining their desperate need for new "incentives." The proposed increases in
business depreciation allowances, for example, are alternatively defended by
corporate lobbyists as appropriate to obtain an accurate measure of capital in-
come in an inflationary economy and as a needed subsidy to encourage capital
investment. This dual characterization allows them to mitigate the perceived
pejorative nature of the "tax expenditure" label and to confuse the argument
when necessary to respond to difficult-to-refute attacks on their positions.'"
tions? Given the pluralistic desire to avoid government interference with charitable activity, one
could well answer this question in the affirmative. Certainly, such a tax expenditure is far easier
to defend as a subsidy to the charities than it is as a benefit to donors.
1 " See, e.g., McDaniel, Study of Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions, in U.S.
COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, DEPT. OF TREASURY, 4
RESEARCH PAPERS TAXES 2417-532 (1977).
"' Professor McDaniel's argument is relevant only to contentions that the charitable
deduction is a proper way to subsidize charities and their donors. It does not even attempt to ad-
dress the income measurement argument put forward by Professor Andrews. See note 66 supra.
113
 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Finance Comm. , 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
241 (March 1976). More recently, Senator Long has admitted that there is at least "some
analogy between a tax program designed to encourage a particular activity and a direct spending
program to encourage that activity." R.B. Long, Luncheon Speech, NAT'L TAX JOURNAL,
Sept. 1979, at 279.
"4
 Several of the leading proponents of the tax expenditure concept have suggested that
the tax-writing committees should share jurisdiction with other committees where tax
"spending" is involved. See, e.g. , Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 2a, at 28 (Statement of Paul
McDaniel); id. at 125 (statement of Fred Werthheimer for Common Cause); CONG. REC.
S5703-09 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.)).
'" If an attack is made on the income measurement argument by pOinting out, for ex-
ample, that corporate taxable income is already far less than inflation-adjusted book income, due
to the $49 billion in corporate loopholes, the business lobbyists typically counter by raising the in-
centive argument. See, e.g. , the statement of Charles E. Walker (who represents a large number
of Business Roundtable clients) and succeeding colloquy during the Senate Finance Committee
hearings on tax cut proposals in July of 1980:
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No such confusion occurred in the case of the energy tax incentives pro-
posed for inclusion in the windfall profit bill. Moreover, not only were the pro-
posals defended solely as tax expenditures, but they were also generally styled
as tax credits, rather than deductions. At first glance, these two occurrences
might seem to represent unmitigated achievements for tax reformers. The "tax
expenditure" label apparently puts reformers on their home ground; the use of
credits is an approach long advocated by some reformers, since it avoids the
"upside-down" effect by which the extent of federal subsidy is dependent upon
an individual's tax bracket. 16 Unfortunately, these "victories" were not
without cost, nor were they clear-cut. As has been illustrated, the level of the
congressional debate was not always the highest, and one major negative effect
of the credit proponents' concession on the "tax expenditure" label and their
general advocacy of credits was to remove some of the arguments which might
otherwise have been made against the provisions. Many of the reform-oriented
members of Congress and their staffs, schooled only in a rather primitive tax
expenditure analysis approach to all tax policy issues, were unprepared to
make or to understand further arguments not encompassed within the limited
framework with which they are familiar. This problem is illustrated by the
large number of normally reform-oriented members who voted in favor of the
House motion to instruct the windfall conferees to accept all the Senate's
energy credits. Reformers should, therefore, be forced to face up to some of the
Mr. WALKER: [One reason we need faster writeoffs is that] with the under-
depreciation that we have seen because of the rapid rates of inflation, the actual
corporate tax is much higher than the 46-percent rate.
But when questioned about another proposal (by Professor Dale Jorgensen), which would com-
pletely solve the inflation problem but was much less generous than the plan favored by the big
business community, Mr. Walker shifted gears:
Mr. WALKER: I don't think we should argue this in terms of theoretical
economics, or how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. , . . I say, let's
look around the world and see what is happening . 	 . Other countries have
very fast depreciation .	 . The people that worked on 10-5-3 [the depreciation
scheme favored by Mr. Walker] . . have as their basic goal to liberalize the
depreciation system. Not to offset what inflation has done . . . .
Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance on Tax Cut Proposals, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 855-65 (June
24, 25, 28, 1980). Conversely, if the business lobbyists' tax expenditure analysis is questioned in
light of, say, the dismal economic record of the seventies in spite of the $26 billion in added an-
nual investment tax subsidies, the lobbyists frequently retreat to the inflation/income measure-
ment argument. See, e.g., the comments of Richard W. Rahn, chief economist of the Chamber of
Commerce, in response to my article, Business Tax Cuts In Perspective, TAX NOTES, Sept. 1, 1980,
at 395. Replying to the point made in this article that the 10-5-3 depreciation plan would be more
generous than immediate expensing and would therefore cause serious distortions in investment
decision-making and generate a huge new tax shelter market, Mr. Rahn states, inter alia, that
"[elven taxpayers who take advantage of maximum acceleration allowed under present law may
not be sufficiently compensated for inflation at today's double-digit rates." R. Rahn, A Critique of
the McIntyre Article, TAX NOTES, Sept. 1, 1980, at 401. (Needless to say, my article had also dealt
at length with the inflation argument.)
16 Even tax credits cannot reach those with no tax liability, unless the credits are refund-
able. It was suggested that some of the energy credits proposed for inclusion in the windfall bill
include a refundability feature to remedy this defect.
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limits to the scope of tax expenditure analysis, particularly as it is understood
in Congress.
The tax expenditure concept is tremendously useful in comparing pro-
posed tax subsidies to direct spending alternatives, and in many cases in il-
luminating equity problems, particularly when an "upside-down" effect
would result from enactment of a proposed tax provision. As a result, tax ex-
penditure analysis has often been an effective lobbying tool in fighting new
loopholes. Nevertheless, in recent years, the basic premise of tax expenditure
analysis — that loopholes can, and in fact should, be analyzed exactly like direct
spending programs — has in many instances had the perverse and unintended
effect of legitimizing the proliferation of new tax subsidy provisions. This result
has occurred due to a number of interrelated factors.
First, it is repeatedly stressed by advocates of the tax expenditure ap-
proach that the term is not a pejorative one."' This position has been taken
largely for tactical reasons, for example, to gain support for inclusion of tax ex-
penditures within the budget process and, more recently, as part of the debate
over sunset legislation. 18 The proposition implicitly suggests, however, at least
to most members of Congress, that some proposed loopholes must be accept-
able. 19
" 7
 The now official view that the "tax expenditure" label is neutral is emphatically
stated in Office of Management and Budget, Special Analyses, Budget of the U.S. Government,
Fiscal Year 1982, Special Analysis G, at 203 (1981): "It should be emphasized that the listing of
specific tax expenditure items does not imply either approval or disapproval of specific provisions
of the tax system." See also Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 35 (statement of Paul R.
McDaniel). In fact, the term "tax expenditure" was intentionally chosen for its non-emotional
character. See Davenport, Tax Expenditure Analysis as a Tool for Policymakers, TAX NOTES, Dec. 1,
1980, at 1051, 1052.
"a See generally Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept and The Legislative Process,
in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 123 et seq. (Aaron & Boskin, eds. 1980).
Advocates of the sunset concept for tax expenditures have sometimes had to tie
themselves in knots to maintain their position that they are not biased against tax expenditures
per se. See, e.g., Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 153 (colloquy between Fred Wertheimer
of Common Cause and Rep. John Duncan (R-Tenn.)):
Mr. DUNCAN: .	 . Mr. Wertheimer, you have referred to "tax incentives
[that] have long outlived their usefulness." Would you identify some that you con-
sider obsolete?
Mr. WERTHEIMER: I think our basic concern is there is no way to figure out
which incentives have long outlived their usefulness under the present process. As
I said earlier, we are not here to support or oppose any particular programs. We
do believe that the present process does not leave room for evaluation.
Mr. DUNCAN: You do make a statement, though, that they are obsolete but
then can't identify any. Is that your answer?
Mr. WERTHEIMER: I would prefer not to specifically testify on behalf or
against any tax incentives right now.
Mr. DUNCAN: I take it you don't know any? Are you saying your statement is
incorrect?
Mr. WERTHEIMER: No.
Mr. DUNCAN: But you don't know of any that is obsolete? I am a little amazed
"9 If not all tax expenditures are necessarily bad, then, afortiori, some must be good. Of
course, the advocates of the tax expenditure concept do not always believe their own rhetoric
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Second, tax expenditure analysis has tended to focus the political debate
over new loopholes on efficiency issues. Admittedly, most proposed tax
preferences fail a dispassionate efficiency evaluation — in fact, it is difficult to
recall a single loophole proposal which has passed such a test) 2 ° Careful effi-
ciency analysis, however, is not always an important influence on legislative
decisionmaking. By agreeing to fight on an efficiency battleground, reformers
have increasingly found themselves overwhelmed by the masses of allegedly
scientific research and computer printouts which powerful interests now
routinely muster on behalf of their favored new loopholes)"
about the neutrality of the term. At a 1979 conference on tax expenditures, the following ex-
change occurred between Professor Stanley Surrey and a member of the audience:
Question. Professor Surrey, ... you mentioned earlier in your presentation that there were good
tax expenditures and bad tax expenditures. Could you give us an example of what you regard as a
good tax expenditure ... ?
[Prof. Surrey:] . . . When you press hard as to whether I can see any useful tax ex-
penditures, I am pushed very hard. . . . I do have some difficulties in finding pro-
grams I would run, if I were running the government, through the tax system
rather than as direct programs.
Tax Expenditure Analysis: A Reply by Professor Surrey and Discussion, CANADIAN TAXATION 26, 28
(Summer 1979).
Before it became fashionable to maintain the neutrality of the tax expenditure concept,
Professor Surrey did not need to be prodded to assert his antagonism to virtually all special tax
breaks. See, e.g. , Surrey, The Federal Tax System — Current Activities and Future Possibilities (speech
before Boston Economic Club, May 15, 1968), at 26 ("I doubt that any of these special tax
treatments could stand the scrutiny of careful program analysis, and I doubt that if these were
direct expenditure programs we would tolerate for very long the inefficiencies that such program
analysis would reveal."), quoted in Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National
Budget, NAT'L TAX J., June 1969, at 241 n.11.
12° Cf. Professor Surrey's conclusion in note 119 supra.
1 " Legislators usually ignore the fact that "one can get almost any answer one wants as
to the effects of tax incentives by making sure that the chosen model has specifications ap-
propriate to one's purpose,''' R. Chirinko & R. Eisner, THE EFFECTS OF TAX POLICIES ON IN-
VESTMENT IN MACROECONOMETRIC MODELS: FULL MODEL SIMULATIONS, OTA PAPER 46,
U.S. Dept. of the Treasury 26 (Ian. 1981).
3 " Proposals for major changes in the tax depreciation rules, such as "10-5-3" and the
Senate Finance Committee's '2-4-7.10," would so disassociate tax depreciation from financial
accounting standards that the concept of a corporate income tax would be rendered meaningless,
at least for large, capital-intensive companies. Although the Carter Treasury did complain about
the loss of linkage between actual and taxable income which these plans would create, see
Miscellaneous Tax Bills III: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 164,
171 (1979) (statement of G. William Miller, Secretary of the Treasury), the significance of this
result seems to be lost on most members of Congress. See Legislating Without a Blackboard, PEOPLE
& TAXES, Aug./Sept. 1980, at 13. It is not lost on some of the proponents of the measures, who
hope that, by breaking the link between tax depreciation and service lives, the way will be opened
for even further corporate tax reductions in the future. See R.S. McIntyre, The Beginning of the End
of the Corporate Income Tax?, PEOPLE & TAXES, Oct. 1979, at 3.
The focus in the "three martini lunch" debate ought to have been on the valuable form
of income that free meals provide to their recipients. Once this is recognized, it is difficult to
justify a 100% exclusion on either tax policy or tax expenditure grounds. Congress, however,
never seemed to appreciate this point. Instead, it concentrated on whether a meals exclusion is an
appropriate way to subsidize the restaurant industry. Although it is demonstrably not, restaurant
employees defended themselves with the usual charts and tables showing such enormous job
losses from reform of the meals rules that Congress was almost unanimously opposed to change.
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Third, by promoting tax expenditure analysis as the key to evaluating
most tax proposals, reformers have created a whole generation of members of
Congress and their staffers who are wholely innocent of an understanding of
traditional tax policy analysis. Issues like proper income measurement tech-
niques are rarely discussed intelligently in the political arena, and the repercus-
sions have been and are being felt in areas ranging from depreciation
"reform" to the "three martini lunch" to the so-called "marriage penalty. ,,I22
Fourth, the focus on direct spending comparisons which tax expenditure
analysis encourages has tended in practice to result in substantial disregard of
the very special need of the Internal Revenue Service for ease of administration
and the importance for taxpayers of simplicity. Certainly these factors can be
included within a broad-reaching tax expenditure analysis approach,' 23 but
such inclusion tends to contradict the assertion that the "tax expenditure"
label is not a pejorative one, especially when proposed loopholes are opposed
on complexity grounds alone.' 24
Finally, and most important, the premise of tax expenditure analysis that
tax incentive proposals should be treated merely as direct spending substitutes
has tended to drastically oversimplify issues of tax equity. Assuming a tax
benefit is crafted to avoid "upside-down" effects and made refundable to avoid
favoring those with no tax liability, tax expenditure analysis tends to give it a
favorable report as far as equity is concerned.' 23 Not everyone is willing,
however, to accept the idea that this is all equity entails. Paying to the govern-
ment one's allotted share of taxes based on an honest report of one's income is
never a cheery task, but it becomes positively onerous when one is aware that
others have had large chunks of their taxes forgiven — for whatever "incen-
tive" reason. It is all well and good to maintain that a proper appreciation of
tax subsidies as merely direct grants routed through the tax system ought to
make ordinary taxpayers less critical of the loopholes enjoyed by their betters.
The common perception of tax equity in the real world, however, is not so
sophisticated. Maintaining a general belief in the fairness of the system is of
high importance in ensuring a reasonable level of taxpayer compliance with the
For an outline of how the various arguments should have been presented, see M.J. McIntyre,
supra n.108, at 98-99.
The "marriage tax" issue ought to revolve around questions about who should be taxed
on pooled income. Instead, it has largely centered on claims that the tax system encourages
diVorce, or that it discourages women from entering the job market. For a discussion of the prob-
lems in the current debate, see M. J. McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal Income Tax: Pro-
legamena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C.L.REV. 469 (1980).
' 23 See, e.g., Surrey, Tax Expenditure Analysis: The Concept and Its Uses, CANADIAN TAXA-
TION 3, 8-9 (Summer 1979).
' 2 ' See note 113 supra. See text accompanying note 75 infra.
123 See, e.g., Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 35-36 (statement of Paul R.
McDaniel) (suggesting that refundable credits solve equity problems, but that administrative
considerations may remain).
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law 126 — a factor which reformers who advocate refundable investment credits
for giant corporations' 27 tend to discount.
Somewhat ironically, the widely-held belief that the tax laws should be fair
has contributed to the pronounced tendency for tax expenditures to expand
once they are established. This phenomenon seems to be most evident in the
energy area. The historically classic example is percentage depletion,'" which
was originally enacted only for oil and gas, but eventually grew to cover almost
a hundred different "depletable" resources, including gravel, asbestos, peat
moss, and clam shells.'" The pressures to expand the recently enacted energy
credits indicate that they have an expansionary potential which may be of even
a higher order than that of percentage depletion.
The potential for energy tax credits to grow can be appreciated by perus-
ing almost any issue of Tax Notes, the weekly tax journal. The lead item in the
summary of incoming Treasury mail will almost invariably describe a letter or
series of letters asking that a mechanized awning, or woodburning stove, or
special reflective roof paint, or carburetor jet adjusting device, or almost any
conceivable device which happens to save energy be made eligible for an
energy tax credit.'" The requests are so voluminous that the Treasury Depart-
126 See Kurtz, Notes to a New Commissioner of Internal Revenue, TAX NOTES, June 1, 1981; at
1195, 1202. Congress has understood the political significance of avoiding gross perceived ine-
quities in the tax system, but at the same time has generally been unwilling to attack loopholes
directly. Therefore, it compromised by establishing the minimum tax, I.R.C. SS 55 et seq. — a
band-aid measure which pure tax expenditure analysis must necessarily condemn as
schizophrenic.
1 " See, e.g. , Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 202, 205 (statement of Gerard M.
Brannon); cf. id. at 162-63 (statement of Emil M. Sunley, Jr.) (suggesting that the non-
refundability of the investment credit is largely for "cosmetic" reasons. But cf. id. at 180 (state-
ment of Jerome Kurtz, Commissioner of Internal Revenue) (noting that leasing transactions
result in a kind of ad hoc refundability even under current law).
126 I.R.C. §5 613, 613A.
129 Percentage depletion has been allowed for oil and gas since 1926. Beginning in 1932,
it was gradually extended, at lower rates, to most other minerals. TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969,
REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE ON H.R. 13270, S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 178 (1969). The 1954 Code made percentage depletion generally available, ex-
cluding only "soil, sod, turf, water, or mosses" and "minerals from sea water, the air, or similar
inexhaustible resources." B.I. EIMER AND L.M. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE, AND
GIFT TAXATION 332 (4th ed. 1972).
1 " See, e.g. , TAX NOTES, Jan. 14, 1980, at 31 (Residential Energy Credit Requested for Coal
Burning Stove; Credit Requested for Heat Exchanges and Wind Turbines; Still Another Residential Energy
Credit Request [— for] `Plasticool'; Sailing, Sailing ... letter asks] whether an ocean-going commercial
sailing vessel . . . will be eligible for a tax credit); id., Jan. 21, 1980, at 77 (Residential Energy Credit Sug-
gested for Hot Water Heaters; Credits Asked for Zone Control System for Heating and Air Conditioning); id.
Feb. 4, 1980, at 156, (Credits for Wood Burning Stoves Supported); id., Feb. 11, 1980, at 196 (Tax
Benefits to Encourage Recycling are Urged); id., Feb. 25, 1980, at 265 (Credits Sought for Wood Stoves and
Solar Heating Systems); id., Mar. 3, 1980, at 301 (New England Senators Urge Woodstove Credit); id.,
Mar. 10, 1980, at 349 (Push Continues for Wood Burning Stove Credits); id., Mar. 17, 1980, at 375
(Wood Stove Credits Continue To Be a 'Burning' Issue; Why Don't Awnings Qualii5, for a Credit?); id., Mar.
31, 1980, at 455 (Credits Sought for Wood Stoves, Aluminum Siding, Awnings, and Insulation; Credits
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ment pleaded with Congress to remove its never-exercised discretionary
authority to expand the list of items qualifying for tax credits. Congress
responded, however, only by establishing hard-to-meet standards for the exer-
cise of that discretion.'''
Sought for Low Temperature Commercial Dishwasher); id., Apr. 7, 1980, at 489 (Taxpayer Wants to Know
Why House Had To Be Completed Before April 20, 1977 To Get Credit for Insulation; Treasury Gets Proposals
on Community Recycling Centers); id., Apr. 14, 1980, at 531 (Insulation Credit for Landlords Urged;
Another Request for Wood Stove Credits); id., Apr. 21, 1980, at 585 (Tax Credits for Wood Stoves, Heat
Pumps, and Thermocyclers); id., Apr. 28, 1980, at 623 (Credits Sought for Temperature Control System);
id., May 5, 1980, at 655 (Energy Credits Sought for Ground Water Pumps and Other Items); id., May 12,
1980, at 719 (Energy Credits Sought for Woodburning Stoves; Qualification for The Business Energy Invest-
ment Tax Credit Sought for Solar Cooling System); id., May 19, 1980, at 751 (Tax Credit for Wood Stove
Sought by Taxpayer; Tax Credit Urged for Wood-Burning Equipment; Company Seeks Insulation Credit for
Slag-Type Roofing Material); id., May 26, 1980, at 793 (Nine Senators Ask for Wood Stove Credit
Meeting; Tax Credit Sought for Small-Scale Hydroelectric Equipment); id., June 2, 1980, at 831 (More Let-
ters Are Received Supporting a Credit for Woodburning Stoves); id., June 9, 1980, at 855 (Energy Credit
Sought for Vapor Compression Hot Water Heaters; Qualification for Tax Credit Sought for Energy Conversion
System and for Windmills); id., June 16, 1980, at 925 ( Viscosity Stabilizer Said To Reduce Fuel Use); id.,
June 30, 1980, at 1005 (Wood Energy Institute Supports Credit for Wood Stoves; Reports on Wood Stove
Credit Said To Mislead Homeowners; Fedders Continues to Urge Tax Credits for Vapor Compression Water
Heaters); id., July 7, 1980, at 15 (Fedders Continues to Urge Tax Credits for Vapor Compression Water
Heaters); id., July 14, 1980, at 75 (Aluminum Can Eater Said To Qualibz for Energy Credit; Energy Credit
is Urged for Coal-Fired Furnaces; Treasury Receives More Letters Supporting Wood Energy Credit); id., July
21, 1980, at 119 (Treasury Receives Another Inquiry About Energy Credits for Woodburning Stoves; Should
Energy-Producing Greenhouses Qualify for Energy Credits?); id., July 28, 1980, at 161 (Energy Credit for
Coal Burning Furnaces and Boilers Recommended; Woodburning Stove Energy Credit Receives Another Recom-
mendation); id., Aug. 4, 1980, at 215 (Taxpayer Seeks Insulation Credit for Second Home; Taxpayer Seeks
Amount of Tax Credit for an Unspecified Type of Solar Product); id., Aug. 11, 1980, at 267 (Tax Credit
Sought for Awnings; Taxpayer Berates Denial of Energy Credit for Gas Furnaces); id., Aug. 18, 1980, at
323 (Expansion of Residential Energy Credits Recommended, Specifically for Wood-Burning Stoves and Vapor
Compression Water Heaters; Credit Recommended for Energy Saving Window Coatings); id., Aug. 25,
1980, at 369 (Heat-Pump Water Heaters, Wood-Burning Stoves, Electric Radiator Heaters, and Evaporative
Coolers Recommended for Energy Credits); id., Sept. 1, 1980, at 407 (Limits on Energy Credits Opposed;
Credit for Hydronic Central Heating Systems Sought; Credit Sought for Geothermal Well With Underground
Heat Pump); id., Sept. 8, 1980, at 465 (3M Urges Change in Regulations to Permit Credit for Window
Coatings; Credits Recommended for Wood-Burning Stoves, Vapor Compression Water Heaters, and Coal Fur-
naces; More Liberal Energy Credits Recommended As Cure To Energy Problems Of U.S.); id. , Sept. 22,
1980, at 579 (Energy Credit Recommended for 'Passive Solar Houses'); id., Sept. 29, 1980, at 631 (Fed-
ders Applies for Energy Credit for Heat Pump Water Heater); id., Oct. 6, 1980, at 683 (Gradison Asks if
Saturated Felt Qualifies as 'Roof Insulation'); id., Oct. 13, 1980, at 739 (Denials of Energy Credits for
Solar Collector and New Furnaces Criticized; Treasury Queried on Eligibility of Thermal Conduction Plates for
Energy Credits). But cf. id. , Jan. 7, 1980, at 11; id., Jan. 28, 1980; and id., Sept. 15, 1980, at 531.
Through Oct. 13, 1980, these were the only 1980 issues in which there were no energy credit
references. These items tend to be at the beginning because the summary is in Internal Revenue
Code section order, and credits occur early in the code.
The windfall profit tax bill sets the following criteria for adding energy items to the
list of those eligible for a tax credit: Treasury must determine, first, that making the item eligible
will result in a reduction in total U.S. consumption of oil and natural gas and that the reduction
is sufficient to justify the revenue cost; second, that adding the item cannot result in increased use
of anything which is known to be, or reasonably suspected to be, hazardous to the environment
or to public health or safety; and, third, that existing federal subsidies are insufficient. Pub. L.
No. 96-223, 4 201(b) (1980); I.R.C. S 44C(c)(9).
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The most obvious reason for the expansionary nature of energy tax ex-
penditures is that there simply is no purely logical stopping place once the prin-
ciple is established that tax incentives for alternative energy development and
conservation are a good idea. If a credit for solar hot water heaters is on the
books, what is the argument against extending the credits to greenhouses used
in passive solar heating — especially since the greenhouses probably save more
energy? Similarly, if a credit for replacing inefficient boiler parts is allowed,
why not a credit for replacing the whole furnace? And so on. While some
discrimination is expected in direct spending programs, the deeply felt — albeit
often violated — principle that the tax laws should be fair makes such distinc-
tions seem less justifiable with regard to tax expenditures. 132
This special fairness requirement which we impose on tax incentives
means that no one should think that we can treat tax preference legislation as
fully equivalent to direct spending. Tax expenditure analysis in skilled hands
can be a very useful tool, but it does not offer a complete means for evaluating
new tax loopholes. The need to maintain public confidence in the tax system
and to preserve the tax base from even further erosion cautions against enact-
ment of tax expenditures even when an analysis based purely on efficiency may
indicate, at least to Congress, that a tax subsidy is appropriate. This point has
not been sufficiently stressed in recent years.'"
1" This feeling may explain why Jim Jeffords (R-Vt.) wanted to make the wood-
burning stove credit retroactive to April, 1977, See text at note 42 supra.
There are other reasons why energy tax credits are so prone to expansion. One, which
may be applicable to subsidies generally, is that once some energy items are eligible, manufac-
turers or installers of others find it necessary to gain eligibility in order to remain competitive. If
insulation is paid for in part by the Treasury, for example, a product which combines insulation
with exterior siding needs a similar subsidy if it is to be saleable. Another reason why energy
credits are susceptible to expansion is that the normal opposition to tax expenditures on the part
of liberals, who are usually concerned about retaining tax revenues for government social pro-
grams, has been particularly weak in the case of energy credits. This is due to several factors.
One is that such tax expenditures are advocated by many of the do-good groups which are tradi-
tionally linked with liberals. Another is pure politics — many of the liberals are from New
England, where the wood-burning stove credit is very popular, since everybody seems to be buy-
ing such a device. Still another has to do with the liberal opposition to decontrol of domestic oil
prices. Having rejected the most effective means of stimulating solar energy and conservation,
many liberals have desperately grasped for any substitute in order to present a pro-conservation,
pro-solar image.
Until very recently, a notable exception to the tax reform apostasy of many liberals when
it came to energy tax credits was the firm antagonism to the tax expenditure approach main-
tained by Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.). Senator Kennedy coupled his opposition to oil
decontrol with a detailed program of direct subsidies for conservation and alternative energy use.
See 125 CONG. REC. S11507-13 (daily ed., Aug. 2, 1979). With the election of Ronald Reagan,
however, even Senator Kennedy appears ready to abandon this effort. Following reports that the
Reagan administration would recommend elimination of the Solar and Conservation Bank, see
note 74 supra, Senator Kennedy proposed to double the business energy conservation tax incen-
tives. See THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE (Feb. 12, 1981).
1 " Professor McDaniel has pointed out that "public confidence, trust and respect ...
are not likely to survive long intensive hammerings of distrust and disrespect that are engendered
by the frequently controversial and emotional areas into which tax expenditures project the
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Perhaps the most far-reaching and disappointing result of the failure to
appreciate these considerations involved President Carter's 1977 proposals for
helping to solve the energy problem with tax subsidies. 134 Without doubt, these
proposals were an important factor in defeating his 1978 tax reform
program,I 35
 and they have probably set back tax reform many years. Respond-
ing to a People & Taxes survey on the future of tax reform in the 80's, Professor
Stanley Surrey attributed part of the congressional shift away from reform
goals to "the Administration's pushing of energy problem solutions that turn
on the use of the tax system, especially tax credits (thus giving the Congress the
idea that the erosion of the tax base was a target for anyone's goals).'*i 3 e
James Wetzler, chief economist for the Joint Committee on Taxation, of-
fered a similar insight: "By my count, in three years the Administration has
already proposed 18 different tax credits, 5 of which have been enacted and 4 of
which are now pending in the energy tax bill. With that sort of leadership, it is
no wonder that tax reform is in trouble."'"
Carter Treasupy Department officials themselves ruefully admitted that
their reform positions were undercut by President Carter's support of the
Energy Department's preference for tax-based solutions to the energy prob-
lem. Witness the following exchange between Senator Bob Packwood and
Deputy Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Halperin during a Finance sub-
committee hearing on several "miscellaneous" — that is, special interest —
tax bills:
Senator PACKWOOD. Mr. Secretary, . . [y]ou and I have had a
lot of go-rounds in the past, sometimes together, sometimes opposed
on bills. The only argument that I no longer will accept is the
Treasury's argument in opposition to bills because they are com-
plex, because I don't find Treasury offering that argument [concern-
ing] bills they support that are equally complex, and the classic
example of course being, and I still wish we had been able to pass
it, the classic example being the passive solar explanation by the
Treasury Department last summer as to'how their own bill worked,
and whereupon the Ways and Means Committee threw up its hands
IRS," Investment Credit Hearings, supra note 3, at 36-37 (statement of Paul R. McDaniel), but he
sees this problem as one of tax simplification and administration, rather than an equity issue.
134 See note 21 supra.
'" The details of President Carter's far-reaching tax reform proposals can be found in
The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and RO -orrn Proposals: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and
Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 160 et seq. (1978). For a generally favorable analysis of this program,
see PEOPLE & TAXES, March, 1978.
"6 Looking Ahead, PEOPLE & TAXES, Jan., 1980, at 2.
137 Id. at 3. President Carter's 1977 proposed "National Energy Act" included tax
credits for insulation, solar energy equipment, and cogeneration, and tax incentives for drilling
geothermal wells. H.R. 6331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 1101, 1301, and 1601 (1977). His 1979
program included tax credits for passive solar construction, solar process heat, woodburning
stoves, shale oil production, unconventional natural gas, and gasohol. See Phase III Hearings, supra
note 19, at 27-29.
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and said it is too complex. And when they say that, it is com-
plex . .	 .
Mr. HALPERIN . . . I would certainly agree with you on the
complexity issue. We are as guilty of not using complexity against
our own proposals as others are. We have given a good deal of
testimony on that issue, . . . trying to suggest that we will restrain
ourselves or try to restrain ourselves if we could get similar coopera-
tion from others interested.'"
Although the Carter Treasury finally may have been prepared to restrain
itself — or to try restraining itself — no such hesitancy to propose complicated
new tax expenditures can be expected from the Reagan administration. Presi-
dent Reagan campaigned on a platform which stressed the need to add dozens
of new preferences to the tax code, the total cost of which could exceed $100
billion a year.' 39 His new Treasury Secretary, formerly chief executive officer
of Merrill Lynch & Co., appears to share the security industry's view that the
tax system should concentrate on incentives rather than fairness,'" and the
new Undersecretary for Tax Policy has exhibited little interest in traditional
tax reform goals in the Past. "'
Furthermore, at a time when budget cutting is at the top of the national
agenda, tax expenditures have an almost irresistible political appeal, since they
have the simultaneous effects of lowering budget receipts while providing
government subsidies for favored activities. Yet the result of such a tax expend-
iture approach is to maintain the need for high tax rates, and even some
members of the President's own party are unwilling to try to perpetrate such a
hoax on the American people. Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.), for ex-
ample, has introduced legislation which would limit tax expenditures to 30% of
the direct spending budget"' — a level which they already exceed.'"
"8 Miscellaneous Tax Bills VI: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management
Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 93-94 (April 25, 1980). The explana-
tion of the administration's passive solar credits presented to the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee can be found in Phase III Hearings, supra note 28, at 54-67. For a pithy analysis of this ex-
planation, see the comments of Rep. Andrew Jacobs, Jr. (D-Ind.), at note 34 supra.
"9 The Republican Platform for 1980, reprinted in 126 CONG. REC. 510379 et seq. (daily
ed., July 31, 1980), advocates, at least implicitly, about $60 billion in added business tax breaks
and another $40 billion in individual tax expenditures. See PEOPLE & TAXES, Oct. 1980, at 1.
140 See, e.g., Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981 (state-
ment of Donald T. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury).
'" For example, on March 14, 1978, Norman B. Ture, now the Undersecretary of the
Treasury for Tax Policy, cautioned the House Ways and Means Committee not to waste its time
on "the petty niceties of conventional tax reform." The President's 1978 Tax Reduction and Reform
Proposals: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3389 (1978).
142 S. 193, introduced by Senator Kassebaum on January 22, 1981, would also give the
non-tax committees jurisdiction over tax expenditures designed to subsidize activities within their
bailiwicks. See 127 CONG. REC. 8553 (daily ed., Jan. 22, 1981).
143 For fiscal 1981, tax expenditures total $229 billion, JT. COMM. — TAX EXPEND-
ITURES, supra note 3, at 15. This represents over 38% of the $600 billion in direct spending
estimated for fiscal 1981 by the Reagan administration. Office of Management and Budget,
Fiscal Year 1982 Budget Revisions 123 (Mar. 1981).
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Many members of Congress would be happy, however, to follow through
with the Republican platform's policy of substituting tax expenditures for as
many direct spending programs as possible.'" Thus, Jack Kemp's "urban
enterprise zones" 15 would replace some of the direct grants to cities. Tuition
tax credits would be an alternative to education funding. 148 An above-the-line
charitable deduction would substitute for grants to the arts and humanities and
some poverty funds.' 47
 Even some liberal tax reformers are suggesting that it
may be futile to fight the tide, and that the best strategy may be to accept the
Republican approach and expand tax preferences to replace direct spending
programs lost through budget cuts. In particular, some liberal Democrats are
already preparing their list of proposed expansions of energy tax credits, 148 in
response to the Reagan administration's plans to eliminate most direct sub-
sidies for solar and conservation. 149 If the income tax is to survive this
onslaught, tax reformers will have to wage an intensive defensive battle, and
the lessons of the windfall profit tax debate ought to be kept in mind.
CONCLUSION
Tax expenditure analysis has always emphasized the comparison of pro-
posed tax expenditures to hypothetical direct spending programs designed to
achieve the same goals. The debate over the energy tax incentives proposed for
inclusion in the windfall profit tax illustrates that Congress will pay more atten-
tion to complaints about the inefficiency and wastefulness of proposed tax
preferences when direct spending alternatives are not only conceivable but are
144 One wag has suggested that the Reagan administration might like to replace the en-
tire budget with tax expenditures. Hilscine, And That's The Way It Is, Wednesday, April 1, 1981,
TAX NOTES, March 30, 1981, at 675. For an analysis of the tax proposals in the Republican plat-
form, see PEOPLE & TAXES, Oct. 1980, at 1.
"s The Kemp-Garcia Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act would provide a variety of
tax incentives — including faster depreciation and reduced property, payroll, capital gains, and
corporate income taxes — to firms, employees, and residents in certain distressed areas. See 125
CONG. REC at S70007 et seq. (daily ed. June 13, 1980). The concept is endorsed in the
Republican platform. See 126 CONG. REC. at S10385. •
16 The Republican platform's endorsement of tuition tax credits can be found in 126
CONG. REC. at S10384. On June 3, 1981, the Treasury Department endorsed the concept of tui-
tion tax credits at Senate Finance Committee hearings on The Tuition Tax Relief Act of 1981, S.
550. See TAX NOTES, June 8, 1981, at 1327. Some of the Reagan administrations proposed cuts
in federal education spending are detailed in Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 1982
Budget Revisions 65 (Mar. 1981).
147 The Reagan administration has proposed a 50% reduction in budget authority for
the Arts and Humanities Endowments, id. at 65, and the Fine Arts Commission, id. at 62.
Above-the-line charitable deductions are endorsed by the Republican platform in .126 CONG.
REC. at 510385. For critiques of this tax proposal, see Charitable Contribution Deductions: Hearings
Wore the Subcomm. on Taxation and Debt Management Generally of the Senate Comm. on Finance on S219,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 a seq. (1980) (statement of Donald C. Lubick, Assistant Treasury
Secretary for Tax Policy); id. at 197 et seq. (statement of Robert S. McIntyre).
149 See, e.g., note 132 supra.
149 See R. Reagan, America's New Beginning: A Program for Economic Recovery, 4-24 (Feb.
18, 1981).
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actually available. In general, therefore, those who criticize tax expenditure
proposals should try to work out the details of direct spending substitutes with
some precision, and, if possible, should attempt to propel them through the ap-
propriate congressional committees. In the current political climate, reformers
challenging new tax subsidies have the particular responsibility to defend ex-
isting spending programs, when they are defensible, and to propose changes in
them when such changes are necessary.
The recent experience with the energy tax credits also indicates the
dangers of relying exclusively on tax expenditure analysis in opposing
undesirable amendments to the tax code and in promoting desirable changes.
Reformers are right in showing that tax proposals advanced for reasons not
germane to the purposes of the income tax almost always make bad spending
programs. Yet, reformers stand little chance of achieving consistent success in
the political arena if they so concentrate their arguments on spending com-
parisons that traditional fairness and tax policy concerns are relegated to a sec-
ond class status. Many members of Congress and much of the public seem to
believe that tax incentives are magical, and over ten years of exposure to tax
expenditure analysis has yet to destroy this belief. Moreover, when the issue is
merely spending, particularly spending which does not appear in the budget,
Congress finds it difficult to resist the blandishments — and the potential cam-
paign assistance — of the proponents of tax subsidies. Consequently, these
proponents have little difficulty in presenting plausible, albeit flawed, justifica-
tions for their favored changes.
Reformers should therefore begin to reemphasize the traditional tax policy
concerns which have been somewhat neglected in recent years. This means
taking the time to explain to members of Congress how some tax provisions
should be seen not as spending programs but as crucial tools in measuring in-
comes, and stressing the real dangers in distorting these basic tax rules. It also
involves highlighting the importance of equal treatment of equally situated tax-
payers — or horizontal equity — and the need for a tax system generally
perceived as fair. Lastly, it demands an increased focus on the special ad-
ministrative problems of the Internal Revenue Service and the importance of
tax simplicity.
Such a reemphasis does not require the abandonment of tax expenditure
analysis — which remains the single most valuable tool available to reformers.
It does, however, involve dropping the pretense that Congress, in accepting or
rejecting tax proposals, is merely making spending decisions. Congress also is
deciding whether provisions of the tax code should conflict sharply with
popular notions of fairness. If reformers are to defend the integrity of the in-
come tax with any consistent success, they must convince Congress that ignor-
ing these popular perceptions of equity is politically dangerous. To make such
an appeal to its fullest degree, reformers must be willing to move beyond tax
expenditure analysis.
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